terça-feira, julho 10, 2018

Lead or leave it!

Poderá a próxima crise europeia nascer, outra vez, na Áustria?

Sair e permanecer no euro, ao mesmo tempo? 

Poderão as criptomoedas e outras formas de dinheiro eletrónico conduzir os países mais endividados do sul da Europa, com a Itália à cabeça, a promover em breve um xeque mate aos alemães e seus satélites do norte da Europa?

Um artigo de Joseph Stiglitz que vai dar que falar, e animar as hostes dos que defendem uma alternativa à zona euro tal como é atualmente gerida avança a seguinte ideia: a Itália e os países do sul da Europa, como Grécia, Espanha e Portugal, poderiam lançar moedas virtuais paralelas ao euro, forçando assim uma reestruturação das suas dívidas, e a existência, na prática, de uma moeda euro com duas faces de desigual valor, sem precisarem de tomar a iniciativa de uma saída voluntária da zona euro. Uma ideia explosiva, a juntar ao Brexit!

A parallel currency for Italy is possibleRome can regain control of its monetary policy without breaking the rules of the eurozone. 
POLITICO. By Biagio Bossone, Marco Cattaneo, Massimo Costa And Stefano Sylos Labini | 7/5/18, 10:10 AM CET Updated 7/5/18, 4:18 PM CET 
In Joseph Stiglitz’s recent article for the POLITICO Global Policy Lab (“How to Exit the Eurozone,” June 29, 2018), the Nobel-prize wining economist proposes that Italy issue a parallel currency as a way to retake control of its monetary policy.

How to exit the eurozoneItaly is right to consider leaving the EU’s common currency area. 
POLITICO. By Joseph Stiglitz | 6/26/18, 1:02 PM CET Updated 7/2/18, 7:23 AM CET 
If Germany is unwilling to take the basic steps needed to improve the currency union, it should do the next best thing: Leave the eurozone. As George Soros famously put it, Germany should either lead or leave. With Germany (and possibly other Northern European countries) out of the currency union, the value of the euro would decline, and exports of Italy and other Southern European countries would increase. The major source of misalignment would be gone. At the same time, the increase in Germany’s exchange rate would go a long way to curing one of the most destabilizing aspects of the global economy: Germany’s trade imbalance. 
From an economic perspective, the easiest thing to do would be for Italian entities (governments, corporations and individuals) to simply redenominate debts from euros into new lira. But because of legal complexities within the EU, and because of Italy’s international obligations, it may be preferable to enact a super-Chapter 11 bankruptcy law, providing expeditious recourse to debt restructuring to any entity for whom the new currency presents severe economic problems. Bankruptcy laws remain an area within the purview of each of the nation states of the EU. 
Italy could even choose not to announce that it’s leaving the euro. It could simply issue script (say government bonds) that would have to be accepted as payment for any euro debt obligation. A decrease in the value of these bonds would be tantamount to a devaluation. This would at the same time restore the efficacy of Italy’s monetary policy: Changes in central bank policy would affect the value of the bonds. 
Hue and cry 
Of course, there would be a hue and cry from other members of the eurozone. Introducing a parallel currency, even informally, would almost certainly violate the eurozone’s rules and certainly be against its spirit. But this way, Italy would leave it to the other members of the eurozone to decide to expel it. 
Rome could take the chance that the fractious members of the currency union would never take such strong action, since that would confirm the fraying of the eurozone. Then Italy would have its cake and eat it too. It would remain part of the eurozone but would have accomplished a devaluation. 
Advances in technology over the past three years make creating electronic currency systems all the easier and more effective. Should Italy choose to use one, it wouldn’t even have to face the difficulties of printing new currency. 
Italy could also blunt some of the pain of its departure if it were to coordinate its exit with other countries in a similar position. 
The motley group of countries that now forms the eurozone is far from what economists call an optimal currency area. There is just too much diversity, too many differences, to make it work without better institutional arrangements of the kind that Germany has vetoed. 
A southern eurozone would be far closer to an optimal currency area. And while it would be difficult to arrange a coordinated departure in a short period of time, if Italy successfully manages its way out of the euro, others will almost surely follow.

Sem comentários: