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| Boa parte do petróleo que alimentou o séc. 20 e alimentará talvez metade do séc. 21 vem da era dos dinossauros, i.e. de há 250 milhões de anos atrás. E está no fim! |
Peak Oil is the “new normal”
A euforia fabricada em volta do petróleo e do gás de xisto obtidos por fratura de rochas de xisto —fracking— não passa de uma e derradeira tentativa de esconder o impacto tremendo que o Pico do Petróleo terá (já está a a ter) na evolução humana. Todos os conflitos militares atualmente em curso, de que o terrorismo é apenas a sua face mais horrendamente visível, têm origem nas disputas geoestratégicas para controlar o que resta de reservatórios naturais de petróleo e gás natural de boa qualidade e relativamente acessíveis. É que abaixo dos 60-80 dólares o barril as explorações são pura e simplesmente deficitárias, e acima dos 100 dólares as economias deixam de crescer saudavelmente, i.e. sem recurso a formas de endividamento insustentável e especulativo.
The global “new normal” é isto: crescimento débil, queda persistente dos rendimentos do trabalho, elevado desemprego estrutural e estagnação da criação de novos empregos, pelo menos enquanto não mudarmos de paradigma económico, social e cultural.
No entanto, dada a correlação existente nos EUA entre petróleo barato e crescimento de salários é possível que o fracking seja uma tentativa desesperada de inverter a queda imparável dos rendimentos de 99% dos americanos à custa de uma mistificação necessariamente temporária e precária.
Oil, the economy’s central power source, is now insufficient for 3% economic growth
Aleklett’s Energy Mix. Posted on January 28, 2015
“If we look back to 2004, the International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that increased economic growth of 3% per year required increased oil consumption of around 1.5%. Looking forward, the IEA predicted that, due to economic growth, in 2030 oil production would need to be 122 million barrels per day (Mb/d). Some weeks later I did an analysis that showed that their predictions could never be realised, i.e. the fuel for the expected economic growth could not be supplied at the rate required (TheUppsalaCode).
Now the IEA has adjusted its prognosis so that, for 2030, it describes a rate of oil production (without processing gane) of 92 Mb/d, i.e. a reduction of 30 Mb/d compared to its earlier forecast. Historically, we have never seen global economic growth without increased consumption of oil. During the 1960s the rate of increase in oil use was 8% per year. From the mid-1980s until 2005 we saw an increase of 1.6% per year. In November 2014 the IEA stated that it was optimistic that there would be an increase in oil use of 0.5% per year until 2035. This is a very significant contraction from earlier forecasts but the significance of this has so far not been understood by politicians and economists.
Our economy is not configured to cope with decreased oil use. We still need oil to transport the goods we wish to purchase/consume (including food) and to drive the vehicles that take us to where those goods are sold. If the coupling between economic growth and oil use is similar now to as it was during the 1980s and 1990s then we cannot expect more than 1% annual economic growth in future, and maybe less.”
Alguns gráficos e referência que merecem atenção
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| Correlação entre preço do petróleoe salários nos EUA |
“World Energy Consumption Since 1820 in Charts”. By Gail Tverberg, in Our Finite World.
