Portugal 76

Os coveiros da pátria
Estamos perante a ameaça de uma insolvência global, que atingirá fatalmente as economias mais endividadas, como a portuguesa.

S&P corta "rating" de Portugal
21-01-2009 (Jornal de Negócios) A Standard & Poor’s cortou hoje o "rating" da dívida pública da República Portuguesa, de AA- para A+, afirmando que as reformas estruturais delineadas pelo Governo são insuficientes para o país continuar a merecer a notação anterior.

E se Portugal, por incapacidade de mais e mais endividamento, um dia destes suspender os pagamentos devidos às instituições de crédito internacionais? Que sucederia? Voltaríamos ao escudo, ou simplesmente passaríamos a figurar num sub-agrupamento do Euro caracterizado por maiores dificuldades de acesso ao crédito internacional e juros bem mais elevados?

UK cannot take Iceland's soft option
21-01-2009 (Telegraph.co.uk) — Britain has foreign reserves of under $61bn dollars (£43.7bn), less than Malaysia or Thailand. The foreign liabilities of the UK banks are $4.4 trillion – or twice annual GDP – according to the Bank of England. The mismatch is perilous.

It is why sterling has crashed 10 cents from $1.49 to $1.39 against the dollar in two days. The markets have given their verdict on Gordon Brown's latest effort to "save the world".

Credit default swaps (CDS) measuring risk on British debt have reached an all-time high of 125 basis points, just below Portugal.

...

Standard & Poor's has quashed rumours that it will soon strip Britain of its AAA credit rating – an indignity averted even after the International Monetary Fund bail-out in 1976. But there was a sting yesterday as it responded to the Treasury plan for the banks. "Market confidence in the sector has eroded to such a degree that it is not clear whether these measures by themselves will bring about a material improvement," the IMF said. "As a result, full nationalisation of some banks remains a possibility in our view." — Ambrose Evans-Pritchard.

O actual governo, em particular José Sócrates e o seu ministro das finanças (o pior da Europa), não se cansam de mentir compulsivamente aos portugueses.

Quando em 2005 se explicava pacientemente neste blogue (1) que o aeroporto da Ota não passava de uma quimera arquitectada pela associação entre a indolente e corrupta burguesia burocrática que domina este país, e a família do Bloco Central; ou lançávamos avisos, em Março de 2006 (2), sobre a iminência de um colapso financeiro, fruto do pico petrolífero e de uma bolha especulativa global, as alegres araras da tríade neoliberal que sequestrou o PS martelavam em cada dia da sua incansável agenda de propaganda, a caminhada de Portugal para o pelotão da frente dos países desenvolvidos deste planeta (3).

Nem com os disparates recorrentes proferidos pela figurinha despachada pelo BES para o actual governo, o indescritível Manuel Pinho, a nossa desgraçada, falida e subserviente comunicação social, percebeu que era chegada a hora de desmontar as ilusões criadas e alimentadas incessantemente por um governo dirigido por uma personagem de opereta manifestamente mal formada e conhecida apenas por dois dos seus nomes próprios: José Sócrates.

Nem depois de aqui termos anunciado pela primeira vez que a nossa dívida externa ultrapassava os 200% do PIB, facto muito mais grave do que o défice orçamental de 3%, ou que em 2005 crescíamos apenas a 0,3% ao ano (4), estando por isso a nossa economia, de facto, estagnada, os economistas (exceptuando Medina Carreira) e os jornalistas especializados em temas económicos se decidiam a falar verdade.

Foi preciso ver cair o BCP, o BPN e o Banco Privado para que as campainhas começassem a tinir. Foi preciso ver a Caixa Geral de Depósitos passar pela vergonha de não conseguir a totalidade do empréstimo que pretendeu contrair no estrangeiro, para acordarmos para a dura realidade. Foi preciso ouvir Miguel Cadilhe denunciar num inquérito parlamentar a cumplicidade do Banco de Portugal no silenciamento do affair BPN/Sociedade Lusa de Negócios, para que todas as aves de rapina do Bloco Central tocassem a reunir, como se, agora mais do que nunca, a salvação da sua pele dependesse de uma solidariedade tipicamente mafiosa. Foi preciso regressar ao caso Freeport (5), desta vez sob a pressão impiedosa da pirata-mor inglesa e dona de alguns dos mais importantes off-shores do planeta, a rainha de Inglaterra, para que o céu da tríade de Macau começasse a cair em cima da maioria socialista, porventura de forma irremediavelmente fatal.

Manuela Ferreira Leite, ao apelidar José Sócrates de "coveiro da pátria", apesar da agressividade retórica, acabou por colocar o dedo na ferida. Numa ferida, porém, de que o seu querido PPD-PSD é cúmplice activo. O coveiro da pátria é todo o Bloco Central, e não apenas o PS, nem apenas o PPD/PSD.

Assim, quando Manuela Ferreira Leite anuncia o fim do TGV, rasgando alegremente acordos internacionais reiteradamente subscritos, mas não do novo aeroporto de Alcochete, nem das desnecessárias e criminosas barragens, nem do excesso de autoestradas anunciadas, temo bem que a sua filiação ao clube dos "coveiros da pátria" seja um caso mais sério do que parece.

A situação geral do país aproxima-se rapidamente dum ponto de ruptura. As causas do problema não são apenas endógenas, mas o endividamento galopante para que fomos levados por uma série de decisões estratégicas erradas, da responsabilidade do Bloco Central, contribuiu de modo decisivo para o colapso que ameaça lançar Portugal numa das piores crises económicas, socais e políticas da sua história.

O factor de aceleração, é certo, vem agora de fora. Tanto pior para nós!

O mundo caminha para uma crise de insolvência sem precedentes (6). Por outro lado, a travagem brutal da circulação monetária mundial tem um efeito semelhante ao de uma onda de proteccionismo (7). A verdade é que não há dinheiro para manter a economia mundial a funcionar com as assimetrias que são conhecidas, sobretudo porque não foi o dinheiro que a fez mover nas últimas três décadas, mas antes a dívida mundial! Uma descomunal dívida sistémica, em cima da qual foram sendo construídos casinos de bem estar ilusório, que agora começam a tombar sob o impacto de um imparável efeito de dominó.



NOTAS

1. 02-07-2005 (O António Maria) — Mas poderá realmente a Portela manter-se por muito mais tempo onde está? Poderiam as pistas do Montijo e de Tires, e novas obras na Portela, configurar uma solução sustentável até 2020-2030? As opiniões dividem-se... e os estudos técnicos também. Segundo Rui Rodrigues, a queda da taxa de crescimento do número de voos e de passageiros, em consequência de novas e mais rápidas ligações ferroviárias entre Lisboa e Madrid (AV e VE), afastaria, pelo menos para já, a necessidade imperiosa de equacionar a construção de uma nova infraestrutura de raiz. O argumento parece razoável, e ainda mais se lhe acrescentarmos os efeitos expectáveis de uma alta contínua do preço do petróleo (praticamente inevitável no actual quadro mundial de aproximação do chamado Peak of Oil Production). Em todo o caso, se um dia tivermos que avançar para um novo aeroporto internacional que altere radicalmente o actual estado de coisas, então a solução mais conforme com a inadiável actualização das nossas prioridades estratégicas no novo contexto europeu estará seguramente ao Sul do Tejo (Rio Frio...) e não no beco da Ota. — in O Lobby da Ota e o velho eixo Norte-Sul.
   
   
2. 02-03-2006 (O António Maria) Num cenário de catástrofe financeira mundial, é de prever a falência de centenas de bancos e sociedades de investimento, já para não falar da falência de algumas dezenas de Estados (congelamentos de salários e pensões de reforma, despedimentos nas Administrações Públicas, subidas vertiginosas de impostos, derivas nacionalistas, etc.) Se a crise vier a ocorrer, como se teme, não será fácil evitar o pânico. Mas se estivermos alerta, poderemos evitar o pior, e preparar-nos com coragem para uma longa e dolorosa metamorfose. — in Maomé e a próxima guerra nuclear.
   
   
3. 05-08-2006 (O António Maria) — Segundo os valores estimados para 2005, dos 214 países considerados, mais de metade (110) crescia a valores do PIB entre 4% e 26,4%. Cresciam a 8% ao ano, ou mais, 24 destes países. A generalidade dos chamados países desenvolvidos crescia abaixo dos 4%. A União Europeia, por sua vez, crescia a uma média de 1,7% ao ano. Portugal, ocupando a posição 202 entre 214 países, crescia tão só a 0,30% ao ano...
   Dizer que este país cresce abaixo da média da União Europeia é, como se vê, uma verdade piedosa sobre a crise que efectivamente atravessa. Piores que os lusitanos apenas há 12 países: Itália, Tanzânia, Niue, Dominica, Monserrate, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Guiana, Iraque, Malawi, Seychelles, Maldivas, Zimbabwe. — in Os sete pecados mortais de um país.
   
   
4. 27-08-2007 (O António Maria) — O que não deixa de ser assustador é o facto de os americanos terem conseguido exportar largas porções do seu crédito mal-parado para o resto do planeta e em particular para a Europa (razão pela qual a crise do subprime atingiu tão duramente a banca alemã e francesa). O que não deixa de ser caricato é que a tão propalada "mão invisível" do mercado se chame afinal BCE e Fed, e que venha aflita socorrer os especuladores, criando para eles taxas de juro especialmente favoráveis, enquanto mantem em alta as taxas dos juros hipotecários das famílias cada vez mais endividadas da América, da Europa e do resto do Mundo! — in O fim da confiança no dólar.
   
   
5. Caso Freeport: polícia faz buscas a tio de Sócrates e ao advogado Vasco Vieira de Almeida 22.01.2009 - 14h28 Romana Borja-Santos (Público)
   
   O Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal e a Polícia Judiciária realizaram hoje, no âmbito do caso Freeport, buscas na casa e empresas de Júlio Carvalho Monteiro, empresário e tio materno de José Sócrates, e no escritório de advogados de Vasco Vieira de Almeida, noticia a edição online do semanário “Sol”. De acordo com o jornal, em causa estão suspeitas de corrupção no processo que permitiu a construção do “outlet”, em Alcochete, e cujo inquérito criminal começou em Fevereiro de 2005.
   
   
6. Phase IV of the systemic crisis: The sequence of global insolvency begins
   GEAB N°31 (January 16, 2009)
   
   In 2007, LEAP/E2020 announced that US banks and consumers were both insolvent. More than a year ago, our team estimated that USD 10,000-billion worth in « ghost-assets » would vanish in the crisis. Both announcements came in complete opposition with the common opinion of that time; however they proved perfectly justified in the months after. In the same line, LEAP/E2020 today estimates that a new sequence of the fourth phase (so-called « decanting phase ») of the unfolding global systemic crisis has began: the sequence of global insolvency.
   
   (...)
   
   Contrary to what political leaders and their central bankers seem to believe worldwide, the problem of liquidity that they are striving to solve by means of historic interest rate drops and unlimited money creation, is not a cause but a consequence of the current crisis. It is in fact a problem of solvency which is digging « black holes » where liquidities disappear, whether we call these holes bank balance sheets, household debt, corporate bankruptcies or public deficits. In consideration of the fact that a conservative estimation of these “ghost-assets” reaches already USD 30,000-billion, our team considers that the world is now facing a situation of general insolvency affecting in the first place the most indebted countries and organizations (public or private) and/or those depending most on financial services.
   
   (...)
   
   How to make the difference between a crisis of solvency and a crisis of liquidity? The difference between a crisis of liquidity and a crisis of solvency can appear rather technical and in the end not very decisive concerning the evolution of the current crisis. However it is not a simple academic dispute; indeed, according to the answer to that question, the actions taken by governments and central banks will either be useful or utterly useless, if not dangerous. A simple example can help to understand what is at stake. If you meet a temporary problem of cash, and if your bank or your family agrees to lend you the money you need to cross over that difficult path, their effort is mutually beneficial. Indeed, you can resume your activity, you can pay your employees and yourself, your bank or your family get their money back (with an interest in the case of the bank), and the economy in general benefited from a positive contribution. But if your problem is not due to a question of cash-flow but to the fact that your activity has ceased to be profitable and will never be again because of new economic conditions, then the effort made by your bank or family becomes all the more dangerous that it was substantial. Indeed, in all likelihood, your first call for funds will soon be followed by more calls, always matched with promises (honest ones we suppose) that difficult times are about to be over. The more your bank or your family has lent you (and therefore the more it would lose if your activity is stopped) the more willing they will be to continue helping you. However if the situation worsens, and it will if it comes from a problem of profitability, there is a moment when the limits are reached: on the one hand, your bank will decide that there is more to lose in keeping supporting you than in letting you down; on the other hand, your family ends up with no money left because you have siphoned its entire savings. Then it appears clearly to everyone not only that you are insolvent or bankrupt, but that you dragged down with you your family or your bank4. You have thus dealt a severe blow on the economy around you, including on your close relatives5. It is important to highlight the fact that all this could take place in all sincerity because you were not aware of the impact on your activity of a sudden change in the economic context disrupting the conditions of your profitability.
   
   According to LEAP/E2020, this simple example illustrates perfectly the situation prevailing today throughout the entire global financial system, a large part of the world economy and all the economic players (including States) who based their growth on debt in the past years. The crisis translates and magnifies a problem of global insolvency. The world is becoming aware of the fact that it is a lot poorer than it used to believe in the last decade. And 2009 is the year when all the economic players must try to assess their real level of solvency, knowing that many assets are still losing value. Moreover a growing number of investors no longer trust the traditional instruments and indicators of measurement. Quoting agencies have lost all credibility. The US Dollar is just a fiction of international monetary unit and many countries are striving to get away from it as quickly as possible. Thus, quite rightly, the entire financial sphere is suspected of being a giant black hole. Concerning companies, no one can tell if their order books are reliable, because in every sector customers cancel their orders, or just stop buying, even when prices are discounted, as indicated by dropping retail sales in the past few weeks. Concerning States (and municipalities), slumping fiscal revenues are likely to result in even higher deficits and then bankruptcies. As a matter of fact, Russian billionaires, Gulf oilmonarchies, Chinese commercial Eldorados, all the « golden-egg geese » of companies and financial institutions of the planet (namely European, Japanese and North-American ones) turn out to be insolvent or hardly solvent. The question of the solvency of the US federal State and federated states (as well as of Russia or the United-Kingdom) is beginning to be asked by some big international media; as well as the question of the solvency of large capital-based pension funds, major players in this past twenty years’ globalised economy.
   
   According to LEAP/E2020, the trend is clear: the sequence that has begun this year is a sequence of global insolvency.
   
   
7. Where did all the money disappear? Liquid fantasies
   by Satyajit Das, December 15, 2008 (Prudent Bear)
   
   In recent years, money was cheap and other assets were expensive. But as each of the global economy’s credit creation engines breaks down and systemic leverage declines, money becomes scarce and expensive, triggering adjustments that are reversing the run-up in asset prices.
   
   In this current financial crisis, the quantum of available capital, the munificent resources of central banks and sovereign wealth funds, and the globalization of capital flows may be some of the accepted "facts" that are revealed to be grand illusions. As Mark Twain once advised: "Don’t part with you illusions. When they are gone, you may still exist, but you have ceased to live."
   
   ...
   
   It is not easy to fix the problem. Redirection of capital held in central banks and sovereign wealth funds to domestic economies affects the global capital flows needed to finance the debtor countries, such as the United States, and recapitalize the banking system. Maintenance of the cross border capital flows to finance the debtor countries budget and trade deficits slows down growth in emerging countries and also perpetuates the imbalances.
   
   Trade has become subordinate to and the handmaiden of capital flows. As capital flows slow down, global trade follows. Indirectly, the contraction of cross border capital flows and credit acts as a barrier to trade. In each case, deleveraging is the end result.
   
   This opens the way to "capital protectionism." Foreign investors may change their focus and reduce their willingness to finance the United States. Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, indicated that China’s "greatest contribution to the world" would be to keep its own economy running smoothly. This may signal a shift whereby China uses its savings to invest in the domestic economy rather than to finance U.S. needs.
   
   China and other emerging countries with large reserves were motivated to build surpluses in response to the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Reserves were seen as protection against the destabilizing volatility of short-term capital flows. The strategy has proved to be flawed.
   
   It promoted a global economy based on "vendor financing" by the exporting nations. The strategy also exposed the emerging countries to the currency and credit risk of the investments made with the reserves. Significant shifts in economic strategy are likely. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the Chinese central bank, commented: "Over-consumption and a high reliance on credit is the cause of the U.S. financial crisis. As the largest and most important economy in the world, the U.S. should take the initiative to adjust its policies, raise its savings ratio appropriately and reduce its trade and fiscal deficits."
   
   More ominously, Chinese President Hu Jintao recently noted: "From a long-term perspective, it is necessary to change those models of economic growth that are not sustainable and to address the underlying problems in member economies."
   
   ...
   
   The slowdown in the credit and liquidity processes outlined may have long-term effects on global trade flows. The volume of world traded, according to the World Bank, may contract by 2.1% in 2009. This contrasts with growth of 9.8 % 2006 and an estimated 6.2 % in 2008. The expected drop for 2009 is more severe than the last major contraction in trade volume of 1.9 % in 1975.
   
   ...
   
   The global liquidity process was multifaceted. There was traditional domestic credit creation system built on the fractional reserve system that underpins banking. The leverage in the system was pushed to extreme levels. Losses and renewed regulation are forcing this system of credit creation to shut down.
   
   The foreign exchange reserve system was another part of the global credit process. Dollar liquidity recirculation has also slowed as a result of reduced trade flows (driven by declines in U.S. consumption and imports), losses on dollar investments, domestic claims on reserves and the inability to readily mobilize large amount of reserves.
   
   Another credit process − the export of yen savings via the yen carry trade and acquisition of foreign assets by Japanese investors − has also slowed.
   
   ...
   
   Markets placed great faith in the volume of money available to support asset prices and assist in alleviating shortages of liquidity. The perceived abundance of liquidity was, in reality, merely an illusion created by high levels of debt and leverage as well as the structure of global capital flows. As the financial system deleverages, it is becoming clear, unsurprisingly, that available capital is more limited than previously estimated.
   

OAM 520 22-01-2009 18:05 (última actualização: 23-01-2009 12:00)