A heroína financeira

Christine Lagarde: heroína ou metadorna?

Não há meio de entenderem...

Os juros das obrigações europeias estão em queda acentuada, com os investidores a apostarem que Christine Lagarde vai manter a política de estímulos do Banco Central Europeu. A escolha da diretora-geral do FMI para suceder a Draghi está também a impulsionar as bolsas.  

—in Jornal de Negócios, 3/7/209

A malta ainda não percebeu que a destruição das taxas de juro, sendo um recurso para evitar o colapso dos bancos e dos governos, ao prolongar-se no tempo, acaba por funcionar como uma verdadeira heroína financeira, que hipertrofia os Estados, impulsiona a especulação e a corrupção, e arruina os povos—começando, desde logo, por destruir as classes médias. O Prédio Coutinho seria inimaginável em democracias saudáveis. A sua ocorrência revela-nos até que ponto estas já estão ameaçadas pelos novos salteadores e assassinos.

O declínio da prosperidade começou no final da década de 1960, há 50 anos. Uma consequência do fim da fase da aceleração demográfica mundial (por volta de 1964), e do encarecimento real da energia e dos recursos naturais.

Ou seja, é fundamental abandonarmos o maniqueísmo e olhar para a realidade, discernindo a causa das coisas.

Duas leituras recomendáveis:

Clique para ampliar

It's Official: This Is The Longest Economic Expansion On Record

It’s official: as of this moment, the US economic expansion is now the longest on record, entering its 121st month since the end of the 2009 recession (which according to the NBER ended in June of that year), and surpassing the previous 120 month record - the March 1991 - March 2001 expansion - which ended with the bursting of the dot com bubble.

How long will US business cycles be in the future?

With the last four super-long US cycles attributed to globalization, demographics, downward wage pressures, positive global disinflation, fiat money, increased debt/deficits, and QE, then the answer will come from answers as to how sustainable these trends are.

We'll skip demographics and globalization as these are slower-acting, tectonic shifts, and focus on topics that are as salient today as ever - especially with another debt ceiling fight looming in D.C. With regards to debt and deficits, if anything the US has moved into an era of higher structural deficits and higher government debt, according to DB.

[...]

It's worth noting that as the ties to gold were loosened, the economic policy could become more flexible - think more and more debt - allowing the "opportunity" for more stimulus. Deutsche Bank shows this by highlighting the length of each US business cycle but this time with the annual US budget deficit (left) and total Government Debt to GDP (right) overlaid on top. Bottom line: with the US dollar becoming unanchored from gold in the 1970s, it allowed every successive administration to avoid recessions by piling up more debt and spending at an ever faster rate.

[...]

So to conclude, retreating globalization and weakening demographics are more negative for business cycle length going forward. However, while we are still able to run large deficits, accumulate more debt, and conduct more money printing we can still manipulate the length of cycles relative to the past. Maybe inflation is the glue here. Once that starts to structurally increase, business cycle management becomes more challenging.

[...]

As Deutsche Bank concludes, it's an interesting paradox that this cycle has consistently been one of the weakest in terms of economic growth but one of the strongest in terms of asset price growth. It also hints at the extraordinary lengths global authorities have gone to ensure this recovery continued. Liquidity and intervention have been enormous and this has flowed into assets, not the economy.

So as we celebrate the longest US expansion in history and the fourth ultra long cycle in a row, the only question worth pondering is what the costs of what as of July 1 will be the longest cycle in history, will end up being?

—in Zero Hedge, by Tyler Durden, Mon, 07/01/2019 - 06:33
“It’s Official: This Is The Longest Economic Expansion On Record”

Clique para aumentar

O fim da prosperidade petrolífera

What if the “prosperity” of the past 50 years is mostly a statistical mirage for the bottom 80% of households? What if whatever real gains (adjusted for real-world loss of purchasing power) accrued only to the top of the wealth-power pyramid, those closest to financial and political power? What if the U.S. economy and society shifted from “everybody wins” to “winner takes all” or at best: the winner takes most”?

“...how much housing, higher education, and well-being does the average wage buy now compared to decades past? Not much. The statistics are bleak: wages are basically unchanged from the high water mark 50 years ago, which coincidentally was also the high water mark of U.S. energy production until very recently. Adjusted for purchasing power and quality, the average paycheck buys far less than it did 50 years ago.”

—in Charles Hugh Smith, “America’s Concealed Crisis: Fifty Years of Economic Decline, 1969 to 2019”.

BCE continua a cobrar juros negativos

Apertar a política monetária = recessão

Manter as facilidades = adiar o colapso

É bom para o endividamento imparável dos governos, é bom para a especulação bolsista e imobiliária, etc., é bom para as dívidas estacionadas nos cartões Visa e nas hipotecas de casas e automóveis, mas não é estruturalmente uma boa notícia, pois significa que a economia global, e europeia, permanecem frágeis e à deriva. Significa que o emprego estável e produtivo continua a encolher, a população a envelhecer, e a procura agregada global estagnada, os rendimentos do trabalho a decair, e as desigualdades de rendimento a aumentar exponencialmente. A população e o PIB mundiais continuam a crescer por inércia, mas as respetivas taxas de crescimento estão globalmente em declínio. Em suma, acabou-se o petróleo barato. Sem energia barata, porém, tudo o resto vai ficando mais caro. O endividamento alimentado por taxas de juro negativas está a encobrir esta realidade dramática. Mas quanto mais tarde acordarmos para a ela, pior :(

ECB 

Monetary policy decisions26 April 2018 

At today’s meeting, the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the interest rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and -0.40% respectively. The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases. 

Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, the Governing Council confirms that the net asset purchases, at the current monthly pace of €30 billion, are intended to run until the end of September 2018, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. The Eurosystem will reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme for an extended period of time after the end of its net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary. This will contribute both to favourable liquidity conditions and to an appropriate monetary policy stance. 

Portugal, 2017

Política monetária do BCE sem alterações significativas.
FMI analisa às apalpadelas, e não acerta

Draghi prossegue a política monetária do chamado Quantitative Easing como única ferramenta disponível para evitar um colapso sistémico de consequências imprevisíveis. Fará alguma retenção no volume das aquisições de dívida pública, bancária e de alguns setores empresariais, entre abril e dezembro de 2017 (de 80 para 60 mil milhões de euros/ mês), ajudando assim a agenda eleitoral de Angela Merkel, mas promete desde já, se for necessário, intensificar em 2018, em volume, ou em duração, este mesmíssimo programa de Quantitative Pleasing: taxas de juro a zero ou abaixo de zero, aquisições maciças de dívida pública e privada, em suma, monetização de uma parte muito substancial da super-dívida que pesa sobre a maioria dos países do planeta, incluindo a rica Europa.

Sobre Portugal convém destacar o seguinte:

• vai crescer menos do que a União Europeia em 2016-2017 (1,3% contra 1,7%) e em 2018-2019 (1,2% contra 1,6%), 
• terá uma inflação ligeiramente acima da média dos países da União Europeia: 0,5% contra 0,2% em 2016, 1,4% contra 1,3% em 2017, 1,6% contra 1,5% em 2018.
• a rentabilidade das OT10 (3,51% em 11/11/2016) continua muito acima da média europeia e mais do dobro das obrigações espanholas (1,474% em 11/11/2016).
• no entanto, a nossa dívida total (pública e privada) em % do PIB é a terceira mais pesada do mundo, só ultrapassada pela da Irlanda e pela do Japão. O que significa que estamos demasiado expostos à evolução das taxas de juro e de câmbio, e aos preços da energia (petróleo) e das matérias primas.

Este gráfico do McKinsey Global Institute é demasiado claro!

No prazo da atual legislatura, os ventos são pois razoavelmente favoráveis à Frente Popular Pós-Modenra instalada no poder. A menos que haja uma alteração radical no sistema mundial e na adaptação económico-financeira em curso, haverá condições para o PCP e o Bloco de Esquerda continuarem a suportar o governo de António Costa, ainda que à custa de uma menorização acelerada do peso eleitoral destes pequenos partidos. Se o PS consolidar a sua maioria autárquica no final de 2017, sobretudo se for à custa do PSD e do CDS, haverá condições para uma renovação da atual solução governativa, possivelmente com a entrada do PCP e do Bloco no próximo governo —única forma de obviarem a sua já evidente erosão eleitoral.

Mas se o PCP continuar a perder câmaras para o PS a história será outra. É bem possível que haja um acordo entre o PS e o PCP para proteger as câmaras do PCP... em troca de candidatos comunistas fracos em Lisboa, claro!

Já agora convém dizer o seguinte: apesar de existir um Bloco Central Eleitoral, não haverá regresso ao Regime de Bloco Central, e muito menos a um Governo de Bloco Central.

A separação de águas foi iniciada por Pedro Passos Coelho e prossegue com a geringonça. O que começamos a ter em seu lugar é uma espécie de Grande Coligação camuflada, onde António Costa se dedica a aplicar a famosa tática do salame ao PSD, e o Presidente da República, percebendo o perigo da dialética agressiva da chamada 'esqueda' contra a designada 'direita', decidiu recentemente refrear o seu entusiasmo pela geringonça.

Faz bem Passos Coelho em fustigar Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, por forma a forçar o Presidente da República a decidir que papel quer desempenhar neste jogo.

Por sua vez, o contexto internacional e nacional pode definir-se pela seguinte frase que ninguém diz, mas que os poderes instalados praticam:

— há que ir ensopando o buraco negro das dívidas... aumentando a pressão fiscal sobre a economia paralela, continuando a confiscar paulatinamente a poupança das famílias e, desejavelmente, reorganizando o uso das disponibilidades orçamentais, tendencialmente decrescentes, em prol de uma estratégia de renovação económica, social e cultural, eficiente e sustentável.

A economia já não consegue arrancar nos termos da ida 'price revolution', que durou desde 1886/87 até 1973/2008. Entrámos numa era de crescimento real* ténue (entre 0 e 1%), desinflação (inflação entre 0 e 2%), desemprego estrutural, mas também de acelerada inovação tecnológica, social e... cultural.

A hipertrofia dos governos e dos estados sociais vai ceder necessariamente a sua hegemonia burocrática a uma nova realidade económica, política e social em acelerada gestação: empresas globais (como esta onde escrevo e publico os meus textos), generalização dos mapas democráticos (como, por exemplo, este), bancos automáticos, lavandarias automáticas, lojas online, restauração em modo auto-serviço, mobilidade em rede com ou sem condutor, telemedicina, universidades online, e o fim do jornalismo como o conhecemos até ao seu presente estrebuchar indigente no pântano do endividamento que perde dia a dia as suas proteções político-partidárias. O mundo mudou no dia em que o Presidente dos Estados Unidos dispensou os média tradicionais (hierárquicos e centralizados/ broadcast) e passou a usar o Twitter!

Continuará a haver lugar para as pessoas, pois o consumo das máquinas não dá lucro, e sim despesa. Mas lá que a transição em curso, sobretudo a metamorfose social e cultural, é e vai continuar a ser dolorosa, vai. Por isso defendo a criação de um Rendimento Básico Incondicional, eliminando do estado social os intermediários da fome.

Por fim, a Trumpnomics vai forçar o princípio dos vasos comunicantes na globalização.

O mundo já não é bipolar, nem unipolar. A globalização só tem um caminho viável à sua frente: reconhecer que a produtividade, o comércio, a política e a força militar mundiais passaram a definir, de modo ao mesmo tempo complementar e diferenciado, grandes placas geo-estratégicas: EUA, China, Rússia, Brasil e Europa Ocidental (até ver...).

* O crescimento real das economias é menor do que os números dos respetivos PIB dão a entender. Desde logo porque uma parte crescente do consumo que conta para o crescimento tem sido alimentado pelo sobre-endividamento privado e público.


EXCERTOS DO BCE E DO FMI

BCE

As regards non-standard monetary policy measures, we will continue to make purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) at the current monthly pace of €80 billion until the end of March 2017. From April 2017, our net asset purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of €60 billion until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. If, in the meantime, the outlook becomes less favourable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment of the path of inflation, the Governing Council intends to increase the programme in terms of size and/or duration. The net purchases will be made alongside reinvestments of the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP. [...] 

The key ECB interest rates were kept unchanged and we continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. [...] 

This assessment is broadly reflected in the December 2016 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP increasing by 1.7% in 2016 and 2017, and by 1.6% in 2018 and 2019. Compared with the September 2016 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real GDP growth is broadly unchanged. The risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook remain tilted to the downside. [...] 

According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation in November 2016 was 0.6%, up further from 0.5% in October and 0.4% in September. This reflected to a large extent an increase in annual energy inflation, while there are no signs yet of a convincing upward trend in underlying inflation. Looking ahead, on the basis of current oil futures prices, headline inflation rates are likely to pick up significantly further at the turn of the year, mainly owing to base effects in the annual rate of change of energy prices. Supported by our monetary policy measures, the expected economic recovery and the corresponding gradual absorption of slack, inflation rates should increase further in 2018 and 2019.
This pattern is also reflected in the December 2016 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation at 0.2% in 2016, 1.3% in 2017, 1.5% in 2018 and 1.7% in 2019. By comparison with the September 2016 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for headline HICP inflation is broadly unchanged. [...] 

The implementation of structural reforms in particular needs to be substantially stepped up to reduce structural unemployment and boost potential output growth in the euro area. Structural reforms are necessary in all euro area countries. The focus should be on actions to raise productivity and improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, which are vital to increase investment and boost job creation. [...] 

Fiscal policies should also support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the European Union. Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact over time and across countries remains crucial to ensure confidence in the fiscal framework. At the same time, it is essential that all countries intensify efforts towards achieving a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. 

in “Introductory statement to the press conference”
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB
Frankfurt am Main, 8 December 2016
Link

Expanded asset purchase programme 

The expanded asset purchase programme (APP) includes all purchase programmes under which private sector securities and public sector securities are purchased to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. It consists of the 

—third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3)
—asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP)
—public sector purchase programme (PSPP)
—corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) 

Monthly purchases in public and private sector securities amount to €80 billion on average (from March 2015 until March 2016 this average monthly figure was €60 billion) 

in ECB/ Asset purchase programmes

FMI (os acertos das previsões —políticas— têm uma qualidade duvidosa. Basta comparar as previsões de setembro com as de dezembro e junho deste ano)

Portugal’s near-term outlook has improved, primarily on the back of an acceleration of exports seen in the third quarter of 2016. This higher-than-expected growth outturn followed relatively subdued activity in the preceding two quarters. However, a continuation of strong growth that is broad-based would be needed to conclude that a sustained shift to a faster-paced recovery is underway. The authorities’ 2016 fiscal targets are within reach, and the current account is projected to remain in a small surplus. Against the background of improved consumer confidence, the near-term risks to the macroeconomic outlook are broadly balanced. The medium-term outlook, however, remains broadly unchanged and is vulnerable to shocks, given the high stock of public and private debt, continuing banking sector weaknesses, and persistent structural rigidities. This calls for ambitious efforts to improve the resilience of the financial sector, ensure durable fiscal consolidation, and raise the economy’s growth potential 

1. Recent macroeconomic developments point to a near-term rebound from the subdued activity in the first half of the year. Real GDP grew by 1.6 percent (year-on-year) in the third quarter—up from 0.9 percent in the first half of 2016—driven primarily by net exports. The labor market has continued to strengthen, and the unemployment rate has declined to the pre-crisis level of 10.5 percent. Staff now expects economic activity to expand by 1.3 percent in both 2016 and 2017. Looking further ahead, the economy’s high level of indebtedness and persistent structural rigidities are expected to constrain growth at around 1.2 percent over the medium term 

2. Based on the latest data, staff estimates a fiscal deficit of around 2.6 percent of GDP in 2016, implying an expansion of 0.4 percent of GDP in structural primary terms. The authorities’ strong efforts at containing intermediate consumption and public investment well below budgetary allocations have mitigated the impact of a sizeable revenue underperformance on the headline deficit. Gross public debt is projected to reach 131 percent of GDP at the end of 2016. 

3. The recently-approved 2017 budget aims for a further reduction in the fiscal deficit, to 1.6 percent of GDP. Based on the specified measures, staff projects a fiscal deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP—an implied primary structural tightening of 0.1 percent of GDP—with public debt remaining elevated at 130 percent of GDP. Under staff’s macroeconomic assumptions, achieving the authorities’ fiscal deficit target would require an additional structural effort of 0.4 percent of GDP. A consolidation effort based on durable expenditure reforms would be more supportive of growth than relying on compression of public investment. 

in “Portugal: Staff Concluding Statement of the Fifth Post-Program Monitoring Mission”
December 8, 2016
Link 

“IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with Portugal”
September 22, 2016
Link 

“Portugal: Concluding Statement of the Fourth Post-Program Monitoring and 2016 Article IV Consultation Discussions”
June 30, 2016
Link

Última atualização: 31/12/2016 23:12  WET

Deutsche Bank, o próximo Momento Minsky

Atenção! Vai haver dinheiro do BCE para recapitalizar a Caixa

Folkerts-Landau : “A Europa está muito doente”.

Porquê? Porque o Deutsche Bank está cada vez mais próximo do Lehman Brothers... Perdeu mais de 60% do seu valor desde julho do ano passado, regista uma exposição aos derivados especulativos próxima do PIB nominal do planeta, e hoje, domingo, o seu economista chefe, David Folkerts-Landau, a pretexto da gravíssima crise bancária italiana, transmitiu ao Welt que são precisos 150 mil milhões de euros para impedir um colapso bancário e financeiro na Europa. E disse ainda que as regras da União Bancária terão que ser suspensas neste caso. Em vez de um ‘bail-in’, insuportável pelos bancos e capaz de provocar uma corrida europeia aos depósitos (o Banif foi mais uma cobaia, como agora se vê), há que avançar rapidamente para a um ‘bail-out’, ou seja, para um resgate público em larga escala da banca europeia atulhada de incobráveis, imparidades e exposição especulativa aos derivados financeiros OTC. Só não disse, o economista-chefe do Deutsche Bank, que a grande bomba pronta a explodir se chama, precisamente, Deutsche Bank. 

Ora aqui está uma notícia sumamente indigesta para Wolfgang Schauble, e em breve, para o resto dos europeus. Só António Costa terá razões para sorrir.

Por fim, segundo o mesmo Folkerts-Landau, a equação da desgraça é esta: 

fraco crescimento + endividamento elevado + deflação = crise


Já sabíamos!

ANEXO: alguns gráficos que ajudam a perceber o problema...

Minsky Moment (Wikipedia)

A Minsky moment is a sudden major collapse of asset values which is part of the credit cycle or business cycle. Such moments occur because long periods of prosperity and increasing value of investments lead to increasing speculation using borrowed money. The spiraling debt incurred in financing speculative investments leads to cash flow problems for investors. The cash generated by their assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the debt they took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt lenders to call in their loans. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values. Meanwhile, the over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their less-speculative positions to make good on their loans. However, at this point no counterparty can be found to bid at the high asking prices previously quoted. This starts a major sell-off, leading to a sudden and precipitous collapse in market-clearing asset prices, a sharp drop in market liquidity, and a severe demand for cash.

Vítor Constâncio Superstar

Mario Draghi e Vítor Constâncio encostam a Alemanha às cordas

In defence of Monetary Policy 

Opinion piece by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB
ECB, 11 March 2016 

The notion that monetary policy alone cannot raise trend growth is mostly true but trivial, especially if the challenges of secular stagnation highlighted by Robert Gordon in his brilliant new book are considered.
[...]
“Structural reforms are essential for long-term potential growth, but it is difficult to see how they could spur growth significantly in the next two years, especially when the current problem is lack of global demand”.
[...]
To normalise inflation in the euro area we urgently need higher growth that can reduce negative output and unemployment gaps, using all really available policies. If not monetary policy, then what?Começa a ficar claro de onde vem a frase 'virar a página da austeridade': do BCE! 

Percebe-se agora a gaffe de Moscovici, seguida de um recuo acordado na condição de que o fiasco não fosse explorado por António Costa.

Parecera há dias, ao comissário europeu, que não poderia admitir em Portugal um alívio da austeridade quando o socialista Hollande está a infligir aos franceses um suplício financeiro, económico e social semelhante ao que Passos Coelho e Portas foram forçados a impor aos portugueses depois de um desvario de duas décadas de economia especulativa, populismo partidário, endividamento pornográfico e uma corrupção desenfreada.

Moscovici desconhecia naturalmente que o BCE iria proceder a uma monetização radical das dívidas europeias, contornando a célebre interdição alemã à emissão de obrigações europeias (eurobonds).

A conferência de imprensa do BCE do dia 10 de março de 2016 poderá ter sido a última tentativa de Mario Draghi e Vítor Constâncio evitarem reconhecer que a deflação veio para ficar e que deriva exclusivamente de uma quebra duradoura da procura agregada mundial, a qual, por sua vez, inaugurou, no início deste século, uma nova era de crescimento débil na economia, desemprego estrutural prolongado, diminuição dos rendimentos do trabalho e do capital, falência dos governos e dos estados sociais nas suas atuais configurações, tensões sociais e, por fim, a emergência dos novos paradigmas que fundarão a sociedade global pós-capitalista.

Duas deputadas europeias portuguesas poderão ter dado um auxílio precioso a Vítor Constâncio e a Mario Draghi neste verdadeiro tour de force conceptual do BCE. São elas Maria João Rodrigues e Elisa Ferreira. Por acaso, ou talvez não, duas socialistas particularmente inteligentes e determinadas.

Percebo agora claramente o otimismo de António Costa, e a razão do seu ataque ao governador do Banco de Portugal. Como cheguei a sugerir no programa televisivo Política Sueca, a grosseria do atual PM para com Carlos Costa tinha as costas quentes, ou melhor, um patrocínio de peso!

No dia 11 de março de 2016, um post do vice-presidente do BCE, no blog da instituição, causou algum furor nos meios financeiros internacionais

Após a conferência que reduziu a zero a taxa de juro de referência do Banco Central Europeu, que anunciou taxas de juro negativas para os depósitos bancários preguiçosos, estacionados no BCE, e que anunciou a emissão virtual de 80 mil milhões de euros mensais destinados a ensopar uma das maiores, ou mesmo a maior restruturação de dívidas até hoje levada a cabo na Europa, Vítor Constâncio veio anunciar Urbi et Orbi que não existe outra saída para esta monumental crise.

Depois de recomendar o último livro de Robert J. Gordon, defende o que é mais ou menos óbvio há já alguns anos, mas que os políticos e a generalidade dos macro-economistas se recusam a admitir: estamos a viver o início de uma estagnação secular.

Ora se a estagnação secular e a deflação que a precede já estão entre nós, e se a era de equilíbrio dos preços (como lhe chama David Hackett Fisher) se anuncia no horizonte, prometendo novos paradigmas energéticos, tecnológicos, sociais e culturais, parece evidente, a Vítor Constâncio e a todos nós, que as chamadas reformas estruturais e a repressão fiscal das classes médias não são, nem poderão nunca ser, o remédio de curto prazo para um problema que é, afinal, secular. Muito pelo contrário, os factos analisados, nomeadamente pelo FMI e pela OCDE, apontam para a evidência de um agravamento e aceleração da própria crise de crescimento, ou seja, para maior estagnação, maior deflação, e crises sociais, políticas e diplomáticas potencialmente explosivas, nomeadamente se se insistir em consolidações fiscais demasiado agressivas e desiguais (corporativas, burocráticas, plutocráticas, ou populistas).

Significa esta tese que o endividamento público poderá continuar?

Não, mas vai ser necessário prever e financiar períodos de adaptação mais longos e graduais do que os que foram experimentados em Chipre, na Grécia, na Irlanda, em Espanha ou em Portugal. Ou seja, vamos ter que passar de uma austeridade violenta e cega, para uma austeridade inteligente.

Neste transe, o sistema financeiro continuará a ser decisivo, mas já não poderemos contar com os bancos tradicionais como fizemos até 2008. Sobretudo com os bancos de investimento que acabaram, praticamente todos, por degenerar em lixeiras de produtos derivados especulativos, boa parte dos quais oriundos da tentativa desesperada de fugir ao que Karl Marx designava por lei da queda tendencial da taxa de lucro, i.e. lei da queda tendencial das taxas de exploração do trabalho, a que podemos acrescentar os limites ao crescimento impostos pela própria Natureza.

Perfila-se no horizonte um novo sistema financeiro protagonizado pelos bancos centrais dos Estados Unidos, da Eurolândia, do Japão e da China. Tudo o resto, de algum modo, ficará sob o poder das decisões que estas instituições globais tomarem. O fim das notas de 500 euros, e o fim das notas de 200 dólares são apenas o prenúncio de algo inesperado, que não estava certamente nas agendas dos epígonos do marxismo.

Graphic; McKinsey

NOTA

O surpreendente post de Vítor Constâncio evoca o mais recente livro de Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War, mas poderia também evocar outros títulos e reflexões fundamentais e publicados ao longo dos últimos quarenta anos:

• The Limits to Growth (1972) de Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, 
• a primeira edição inglesa (1973) dos célebres Grundrisse (1858), de Karl Marx, 
• The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1987), de Paul Kennedy, 
• The End of Work (1995), de Jeremy Rifkin, 
• The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (1996), de David Hackett Fischer, 
• e ainda o recém publicado Postcapitalism (2016), de Paul Mason.

Entretanto, vale a pena começar por ler este comentário e a pergunta de Malcolm Barr a propósito do post de Vítor Constâncio.

ECB vice president Vítor Constâncio has published an “opinion piece” on the ECB website, entitled “In Defence of Monetary Policy” – an unusual step the day after an ECB decision.
The Guardian, 11/3/2016 13:20 (Updated at 2.20pm GMT)

Malcolm Barr at JPMorgan Chase says he can’t recall any instances of senior ECB officials putting pen to paper (as opposed to giving interviews) so soon after an ECB decision. In his view, two things in this piece stand out. One he would welcome, the other he finds thoroughly confusing. 

A reality check on fiscal policy and structural reform. Constancio points out that there are significant legal and political constraints on the ability of countries to use fiscal policy to stimulate growth. In his words “countries that could use fiscal space, won’t; and many that would use it, shouldn’t”. The hint that these constraints may be at least a little unhelpful reflects the drift of opinion on this issue we have been seen of late from the leadership of the ECB. What Constancio has to say about structural reform, however, cuts somewhat against the grain. Pointing out that structural reforms tend to be deflationary in the first instance, he states: “Structural reforms are essential for long-term potential growth, but it is difficult to see how they could spur growth significantly in the next two years, especially when the current problem is lack of global demand”. We agree, and it is refreshing to see the ECB acknowledge this so openly. 

Why the bound at -0.4%? Having argued that monetary policy has had to step into the void left by other policies, Constancio argues that monetary policy has boosted growth by around two-thirds of a percentage point over the last two years. But “all policies have limits. In the case of the instruments, we are now using, this is particularly true of negative interest rates on our deposit facility. The reasons are more fundamental than just the effect on banks”. At this point Constancio cites a recent blog by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, before pointing out that bank returns on equity in the Euro area went up in 2015 despite negative rates. But if it is not the impact on bank profitability that sets a limit to the usefulness of negative rates, then what is the “more fundamental” reason?

Do nosso habitual crítico anti União Europeia, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, mais uma acha para a fogueira...

ECB's Draghi plays his last card to stave off deflation
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Telegraph, 10 MARCH 2016 • 9:21PM

Professor Richard Werner from Southampton University, the man who invented the term QE, said the ECB’s policies are likely to destroy half of Germany’s 1,500 savings and cooperative banks over the next five years. They cannot pass on the negative rates to savers so their own margins are suffering. “They are under enormous pressure from regulatory burdens already, and now they are reaching a tipping point,” he said. These banks make up 70pc of German deposits and provide 90pc of loans to small and medium firms, the Mittelstand companies that form the backbone of German industry.
Prof Werner said these lenders are being punished in favour of banks that make their money from asset bubbles and speculation. “We have learned nothing from the financial crisis. The sooner there is a revolt in Germany, the better,” he said.

REFERÊNCIAS

The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (2016) By Robert J. Gordon

TED conference by Robert J. Gordon

Postcapitalism (2016)
By  Paul Mason

In these musings, not published until the mid-20th century, Marx imagined information coming to be stored and shared in something called a “general intellect” – which was the mind of everybody on Earth connected by social knowledge, in which every upgrade benefits everybody. In short, he had imagined something close to the information economy in which we live. And, he wrote, its existence would “blow capitalism sky high” (LINK)

The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (1996)
By David Hackett Fischer

The End of Work (1995)
By Jeremy Rifkin

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1987)
By Paul Kennedy

Grundrisse (1857/58; ET 1973)
By Karl Marx

[“The Fragment on Machines” ; on the General Intellect]

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process.

Portugal: a dívida mais cara da zona euro

Clique para ampliar. Gráfico interativo: aqui.

É tempo de falar verdade, em vez de tergiversar

Juros da dívida portuguesa descem em dia de debate do OE Jornal de Negócios. Rui Barroso | 22 Fevereiro 2016, 10:32 

A taxa exigida pelos investidores passou abaixo de 3,4%, com uma descida de quatro pontos base em relação a sexta-feira. A "yield" é de 3,398%. O dia também está a ser de descidas ligeiras nas taxas italianas e espanholas. Nas obrigações italianas a dez anos, a "yield" desde 3,1 pontos base para 1,533%. Já nos títulos espanhóis, a taxa desce de 1,705% para 1,698%. 

A queda das taxas portuguesas ocorre no dia em que o Parlamento começa a discutir o Orçamento do Estado e depois das obrigações nacionais terem passado por alguma pressão do mercado. A 11 de Fevereiro, a "yield" a dez anos ultrapassou durante a sessão a fasquia de 4,5%, com alguns bancos de investimento a mostrarem preocupação sobre a decisão da DBRS sobre o "rating" de Portugal. A agência canadiana é a única das consideradas pelo BCE que avalia a dívida nacional acima de "lixo", condição para que as obrigações portuguesas sejam incluídas nas compras do banco central.

O título do Jornal de Negócios é enganador. Os 'yields' da dívida pública portuguesa (3,398%) a 10 anos superam em mais de 10x a média dos títulos triplo AAA da zona euro (0,332% em 18/2/2016), e quase 4x mais elevados que a média de todos os títulos da zona euro (0,958%). Como sublinhou o FMI, a dívida portuguesa é a mais cara da zona euro.

O Dinheiro Vivo cita um estudo de economistas do FMI – “Fiscal costs of contingent liabilities” – que afirmam que Portugal foi a quinta economia, entre 80 países, com os piores passivos contingentes do séc. XXI.

E falta ainda incluir nas contas do FMI as responsabilidades públicas contratuais de 120 PPP: 35% do PIB!

O FMI refere que os contribuintes pagaram 24,5% do PIB – cerca de 43 mil milhões de euros – a bancos (11% do PIB) ou empresas públicas (12,1%). O valor acabou por ir parar à dívida portuguesa, que é hoje a mais cara da zona euro.

As esquerdas lembram-se sempre dos bancos, para cujo buraco tanto contribuíram ao exigirem-lhes o financiamento do regabofe populista partidário, mas esquecem-se invariavelmente do regabofe das empresas públicas, falidas em consequência da mesma lógica que conduziu ao fim da banca portuguesa.

Euro area yield curveEuropean Central Bank/ Eurosystem
The euro area yield curve shows separately AAA-rated euro area central government bonds and all euro area central government bonds (including AAA-rated). It is updated every TARGET business day at noon (12:00 CET). No data or other information are provided regarding any day on which the relevant trading venue from which the euro area yield curve data are sourced is not open for business.
A yield curve is a representation of the relationship between market remuneration rates and the remaining time to maturity of debt securities. A yield curve can also be described as the term structure of interest rates. The ECB publishes several yield curves, as shown below.

POST SCRIPTUM — Vítor Bento deu uma importante entrevista à Antena 1 sobre o Novo Banco e sobre a situação financeira do país. Duas conclusões: ou se nacionaliza o Novo Banco, ou a banca portuguesa desaparecerá a breve trecho. Curiosamente, esta entrevista ocorreu um dia depois do último programa Política Sueca ;) 

Que tal um QE for the People?

Rendimento Básico Incondicional (RBI)

Experiências multiplicam-se na Holanda, Finlândia, Índia, Namíbia e Canadá. E em Portugal?

Em vez de um estado social falido, hipócrita, assistencial, prepotente e que humilha os cidadãos, precisamos de uma cidadania responsável que contemple o rendimento básico incondicional (RBI) como um ponto de partida realista para a cada vez urgente reforma social.

Em vez de derreter milhões de milhões de euros no sistema bancário e especulativo e nas burocracias insaciáveis. que tal criar e entregar diretamente o dinheiro às pessoas? Que tal um Quantitative Easing for the People — como propõe, ainda que com uma distorção burocrática indesejável no modo de implementação, Jeremy Corbyn, o novo líder trabalhista inglês?

Can the ECB create money for a universal basic income? 

Guest post by Teemu Muhonen, originally posted on taloussanomat.fi
Translation by Petri Flander, in BIEN—Basic Income  Earth Network 

[extract] 

The ECB to the rescue 

In recent years, the European Central Bank (ECB) has tried to support the eurozone’s lagging inflation through “quantitative easing” (QE), a measure used by other central banks as well. The ECB has been buying securities from institutional investors such as banks, using large amounts of fresh money. 

So far, national economies have not responded as hoped: despite the increase in the value of securities, consumer prices have stagnated. 

Last year the leader of the British Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn promoted the idea of ​​”People’s QE” in which the Bank of England would channel money directly to citizens, not banks. 

The proposal received wide support, and many people believe the ECB should follow suit. Even former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard praised the idea. 

The expression that Corbyn used is misleading, however, because in his proposal the money is not channeled directly to the public, but to government, which then uses it to stimulate the economy through infrastructure projects and other measures. 

Another model was suggested by a group of 19 economists, who signed a letter published in the Financial Times (FT) in March last year. They proposed that the money should be given directly to citizens of the eurozone countries. The idea was to use ECB money to give 175 euros per month to each citizen for 19 months. 

Economist Milton Friedman once called this kind of payments “helicopter money”: it is as if the money is just thrown at people from the sky, with no strings attached. 

Effectively, what the FT letter proposed was a eurozone-wide unconditional basic income paid by the ECB.

BCE: expansão quantitativa para quem?

«My unconventional argument is that the Fed is much more concerned about financial stability than they let on», says James Bianco. (Bild: Bianco Research/ZVG)

Dia 9 de março as bolsas vão disparar na Europa. E na economia real?

The ECB and national central banks of the Eurosystem will start buying bonds on Monday, March 9 as part of the public sector purchase programme (PSPP). ECB

Se o que Mario Draghi anunciou no dia 5 de março servir apenas para ensopar dívidas soberanas, estimular a especulação bolsista e enriquecer os já muito ricos, espera-o provavelmente, a ele, mas também à eurocracia no seu conjunto, e aos governos nacionais, uma surpresa, isto é, o início de um processo de sincronização das lutas sociais, culturais e políticas contra a destruição da classe média.

Ou seja, se a expansão quantitativa do BCE tiver os mesmos efeitos que teve nos EUA, e no Japão, os 99% que se vão sentir roubados já têm representação política... nos novos extremos da ação partidária...

«Draghi is going to make the same mistake as the Fed»
Finanz und Wirtschaft, 10:17 - März 6th 2015

James Bianco, President of Bianco Research, cautions about the unintended consequences of the new European stimulus program and doesn’t think that the Federal Reserve is going to raise interest rates this year.

[...]

Christoph Gisiger, Chicago —  You have been one of the first in the investment community to correctly predict that QE2 is going to heat up the stock market. Is this also true for the European QE-program which is starting this month?

Sure, just look at the German Dax. It’s up 17% this year whereas the S&P 500 is up 2%. A lot of European stocks have really taken off in the wake of the European QE. It’s going to do the same thing that it did in the US: It’s going to drive asset prices higher. Except now, they are driving yields to negative. They are driving them below zero to get people to go out in the risk curve. So by pushing up asset prices ECB president Draghi is going to make the same mistake as the Fed.

How come?

The program will push up asset prices but it won’t necessarily create jobs and GDP growth. And to that end it will create more strife within the central bank. In the US as an outgrowth of that, culturally we had the Occupy Wall Street movement and we created the phrase «the one percent». So the wealthy own equities and assets and they are benefiting from QE. And that is going to create a lot of unhappiness because if you are not in the one percent you do not own a lot of assets. You are relying on a middle class job and you really are suffering.

Here is my new favorite example: The website TrueCar pointed out that average cars that cost 33’000 $ or less last year in total number of unit sales went up 4%. Cars that cost 50’000 $ were up 30% and cars that cost 70’000 $ or more were up 50% in sales. So if your business is selling 120’000 $ electric cars like Tesla you had a fantastic year. But if your business is selling 22’000 $ Toyota Corollas it was a very, very difficult year for you.

What are the consequences of that?

If Europe is not careful they are going to wind up with the same problem. This program does very, very well for the wealthy in the rich sections of Rome or Madrid.  But in the suburbs where the poor live it is going to create a lot of tension.

---

Se gostou do que leu apoie a continuidade deste blogue com uma pequena doação

O banco mau do BCE

Maria Luís Albuquerque, ministra das finanças de Portugal

Só num sistema financeiro insolvente e disfuncional é que se cobram taxas aos depósitos e se paga para emprestar! 

E nisto, o governo indígena apenas segue a família de lémures japoneses, americanos e europeus em direção ao precipício.

Portugal reembolsará seis mil milhões de euros ao FMI em Março
Jornal de Negócios, 28 Fevereiro 2015, 00:07 por Lusa

A ministra de Estado e das Finanças, Maria Luís Albuquerque, anunciou hoje que, em Março, Portugal reembolsará seis mil milhões de euros ao Fundo Monetário Internacional, o que significará “uma redução muito importante nos juros pagos pelo país”.

Esta gente ainda não percebeu:

1. que a destruição das taxas de juro é uma política deliberada do BCE, imitando nisto as receitas japonesa e amerciana (e não mérito de qualquer ministro indígena—ainda por cima porque quem trata da nossa dívida são os Rothschild);
2. que a diarreia monetária não passa de uma operação contabilística destinada a limpar as dívidas dos sobre-endividados estados europeus, e dos bancos a que estão ligados de forma simbiótica, expandindo até ao infinito o banco mau que o BCE criou dentro da sua própria barriga. Os bancos centrais não estão a criar dinheiro para a economia, estão a expandir as suas reservas monetárias (monetary base) até ao infinito, e nem sequer com depósitos reais oriundos dos bancos comerciais. O que estes bancos depositam no BCE, no banco mau do BCE, são pilhas e pilhas de títulos de dívida pública impagável, que compram aos governos insolventes do planeta, para receber em troca uma liquidez meramente virtual... até ao dia em que tudo impluda.

Recomendo a este propósito esta notável entrevista que vai ao fundo do buraco negro em que estamos todos metidos, depois de termos andado 43 anos a empurrar os problemas com a barriga e a pensar com os pés. 1972 foi o ano em que se publicou o estudo prospetivo The Limits to Growth—encomendado pelo Clube de Roma e financiado pela Fundação Volkswagen. Lembram-se?

In Search of Solutions – An Interview with Dr. Lacy H. Hunt
Erico Matias Tavares
Sinclair & Co.

[extracts]

Dr. Lacy Hunt: I think that monetary policy at this stage of the game is largely bankrupt. There is certainly nothing that they can do.

[...] I’m only going to defend what is going on in the bond market and the bond market is a very good economic indicator. When bond yields are very low and declining it’s an indication that the same is happening to inflation and that economic activity is weak. The bond yields are not here for any fluke of reason. They are here because business conditions in the US and abroad are quite poor.

[...]

LH: The US central bank, the ECB and the Bank of Japan have greatly expanded their balance sheets, but that’s not printing money. Money is an increase in deposits that are available to households and businesses. US monetary growth today is under 6% in the last 12 months, which is lower than when quantitative easing started. The Bank of Japan has doubled the monetary base in the last two years and yet M2 growth is 3% and a little bit more. The same is true in Europe.

[...]

LH: (...) according to new research by the McKinsey Global Institute, as well as others like the Geneva Group, the world is substantially more levered now than at the time of the failure of Bear Sterns and Lehman. They calculate that public and private debt is now $57 trillion greater than in 2007, or 17 percentage points higher relative to GDP.

[...]
Erico Matias Tavares: It is said that organizations in crisis tend to repeat the same mistakes, only faster and with more intensity. Japan certainly seems to be following down that path with their latest rounds of aggressive quantitative easing.

LH: I think that’s an excellent example. In their panic of 1989 public and private debt was about 400% of GDP, more or less. It’s currently at 650% of GDP. They have greatly increased the indebtedness of the overall economy but the level of nominal GDP is no higher than it was 23 years ago. The results have been very, very poor.

@linkedin, @zerohedge

---

Se gostou do que leu apoie a continuidade deste blogue com uma pequena doação

Os príncipes do dinheiro

Japão, 2005

Capitalismo de estado, ou banksterismo? Haverá uma terceira via?

E se todos expandirem o crédito ao mesmo tempo? E se o problema for económico, tecnológico e social, antes de ser financeiro e orçamental?

Seja como for, este vídeo é uma peça analítica fundamental para compreender uma parte crucial da crise sistémica do capitalismo global em mais uma das suas dolorosas metamorfoses.

O ponto de vista de Richard Werner — autor da expressão quantitative easing e do “Quantity Theory of Credit”, é a da defesa da expansão do crédito através de políticas monetárias controladas pelos cidadãos, ou seja pelos governos eleitos, em detrimento, portanto, do poder exagerado e perverso dos príncipes do dinheiro e das suas organizações sombrias.

Princes of the Yen, publicado no YouTube a 04/11/2014

“Princes of the Yen” reveals how Japanese society was transformed to suit the agenda and desire of powerful interest groups, and how citizens were kept entirely in the dark about this.

Based on a book by Professor Richard Werner, a visiting researcher at the Bank of Japan during the 90s crash, during which the stock market dropped by 80% and house prices by up to 84%. The film uncovers the real cause of this extraordinary period in recent Japanese history.

Making extensive use of archival footage and TV appearances of Richard Werner from the time, the viewer is guided to a new understanding of what makes the world tick. And discovers that what happened in Japan almost 25 years ago is again repeating itself in Europe. To understand how, why and by whom, watch this film.

“Princes of the Yen” is an unprecedented challenge to today’s dominant ideological belief system, and the control levers that underpin it. Piece by piece, reality is deconstructed to reveal the world as it is, not as those in power would like us to believe that it is.

“Because only power that is hidden is power that endures.”

From Portugal with Love — 1

Raphael Bordallo Pinheiro. "II-A Finança: O Grande Cão" (1900)

Dear Troika,

I feel that I should write to you a weekly post beginning in such friendly way a useful convesation about the country you are trying to help to stabilize its unfortunate economic, financial and political recent evolution. You must know by now that accurate information is not an easy pearl to get! Noise is everywhere. Even for a local dandy like me to know what’s happening is not an easy task. Nevertheless I presume to know by now what are the few decisive barriers we have to cross if we really want to put Portugal in the right path to sustainability and human progress. I assume optimistically that your difficult job may profit from new, independent and above all unexpected insights.

Every Saturday at brunch time I will post a brief memo to you. This first one is about the need of theory before practice. I am actually reading for the second time a marvellous book by Hyman Minsky on the very same and urgent issues that worry most of the macro-economists today, at least in USA and Europe. Big Government he said! Too big right now, many suggest. Can we have “IT” (The Great Depression) again — notwithstanding the huge preponderance of governance in almost all contemporary corners of life?

From Minsky to Yiamouyiannis

How can an exhausted Lender Of Last Resort (Keynes) play the role of an Employer Of Last Resort (Minsky)? Answer: if without some global Debt Forgiveness policy (Yiamouyiannis) it is impossible. On the other hand, fiscal adjustment as the only way to socialize debt cannot solve real issues. It is actually a very dangerous step to try at present pandemic sovereign debt crisis, either in USA or Europe. Overall OTC derivatives notional value amount to more than ten times world GDP. This monster cannot be socialized!

Why to give away our public companies?

Total amount of expected revenues from forthcoming privatization of Portuguese public companies and utilities will not suffice to pay for TAP and CP debts alone. My country is then supposed not only to offer these public companies, but also to heavily pay for such nonsensical give away of potencially profitable business, public utilities and public services. Why not spin-off some of these companies into reliable (even profitable) entities before taking such a suicidal course of action?

Next week

Future roads (SCUTs) and dams (PNBEPH) will drawn this country down the drain of debt if you do not give it full attention, and if we the people fail to stop these huge scams!

And now some juicy food for thought!



By the way: FHFA Sues 17 Firms to Recover Losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Finally, my readings for this weekend:

Stabilizing An Unstable Economy (1986, 2008)
Hyman P. Minsky

Although stabilization policy operates upon profits, the humane objective of stabilization policy is to achieve a close approximation to full employment. The guarantee of particular jobs is not an aim of policy; just as with profits, the aggregate—not the participants—is the objective.

The current strategy seeks to achieve full employment by way of subsidizing demand. The instruments are financing conditions, fiscal inducements to invest, government contracts, transfer payments, and taxes. This policy strategy now leads to chronic inflation and periodic investment booms that culminate in financial crises and serious instability. The policy problem is to develop a strategy for full employment that does not lead to instability, inflation, and unemployment.

The main instrument of such a policy is the creation of an infinitely elastic demand for labor at a floor or minimum wage that does not depend upon long— and short-run profit expectations of business. Since only government can divorce the offering of employment from the profitability of hiring workers, the infinitely elastic demand for labor must be created by government.

A government employment policy strategy should be designed to yield outputs that adavnce well-being, even though the outputs may not be readily marketable. Because the employment programs are to be permanent, operating at a base level during good times and expanding during recession, the tasks to be performed will require continuous review and development.


“Endgame: When Debt is Fraud, Debt Forgiveness is the Last and Only Remedy”
by Zeus Yiamouyiannis, Ph.D., copyright 2011. (in Of Two Minds, September 1, 2011)

Finally serious economists are considering a position I have been maintaining and writing about since the 2008 financial meltdown. Whatever its name —erasure, repudiation, abolishment, cancellation, jubilee— debt forgiveness, will have to eventually emerge forefront in global efforts to solve an ongoing systemic financial crisis.

[...]

Debt grows exponentially indefinitely, growth (income and otherwise) cannot. This leads to a widening condition where the fruits of productive “growth” devoted to interest payments increase until those fruits are entirely consumed. [...] Once this happens, stores of wealth (hard assets) begin to be cannibalized to make up for the difference. You see this in Greece with its sale of public assets to private companies, and in middle-class America where people are liquidating retirement accounts to pay for their cost of living.

This problem is compounded by a private Federal Reserve that lends money into circulation at interest, and then allows the multiplication of this consumer debt-money liability through fractional reserve banking. The money in circulation today could pay only a small fraction of the total private and public debt. That fact alone is evidence of a kind of systemic fraud. “If you just work hard enough, save, and make sensible decisions, you can get out of debt” could only physically work for a bare fraction of the population, given the money-to-debt ratio. The rest would have to simply default to clear the boards.

This is why debt forgiveness makes not only moral but rational, mathematical sense. Finances require balancing to be coherent. There must be some way to redress systemic imbalance. One has to be able to “zero the scales” to get an accurate weight of value and to re-establish healthy value creation.

[...]

...subtle debt extortion creates a system of never-ending debt-slavery for a vast majority of the population. When this “manageable” slavery is aggravated by a desire to use hardship to extort ever greater assets from the overburdened at ever cheaper prices (what Naomi Klein calls “disaster capitalism”), by open and unapologetic widespread fraud, and by the unjust offloading of risk and liability to taxpayers who had nothing to do with poor decisions of private banks, then the systemic abuse is revealed in the daily lives of citizens.

Debt creates scarcity, which stimulates fear, which drives manic competition, which favors opportunism, collusion, and concentrations of power, which translates to abuse, which results in a collapse of legitimacy for the economic system. Overreach causes a breaking point, and we are getting close to it. Will the response be warfare, taxpayer revolt, political upheaval, mass default, debt forgiveness, something other, some combination? I have predicted pockets of violence would be mixed with some softer combination of taxpayer revolt, mass default, political upheaval, and debt forgiveness, along with a return to community exchange to meet basic needs.

Last update: 2011-09-04 10:56