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| Bismarck e Napoleão III depois da Batalha de Sedan |
Plano Varoufakis: trocar a dívida existente por obrigações indexadas ao crescimento (é melhor que nada!)
“Because the major parties have refused to acknowledge the nature of this allocation process, and have turned it into a fight between a creditor Germany, on the one hand, and indebted peripheral European countries on the other, I was able to make in 2010-11 one of the easiest predictions I have ever made in my career — whichever extremist parties, whether of the right or of the left, who first went on the offensive against Germany, the bankers and the currency bureaucrats, I predicted, would surge in electoral popularity and would eventually reformulate the debate”— Michael Pettis.
Se nenhum partido do centro enfrentar a crise das dívidas europeias, nomeadamente em países da zona euro como a Irlanda, Grécia, Espanha, Portugal, Itália e França, a extrema-esquerda, ou a extrema-direita, chegará ao poder com mandato popular para o fazer. Se serão ou não capazes de cumprir a missão, e com que consequências, é algo que iremos começar a perceber ao longo das próximas semanas e meses depois da vitória democrática do Syriza na Grécia. Algo parece já ter perturbado, como nada até agora o fizera, o status quo apodrecido da nomenclatura que mal tem dirigido os destinos económicos, financeiros, sociais e diplomáticos da União Europeia.
Para os que se interessam por estas coisas, o post viral de Michael Pettis(1) sobre o pouco científico jogo de passa culpas entre os credores e os devedores europeus merece uma leitura atenta por parte de quem busque uma resposta ao que parece ser a quadratura do círculo: como resolver as gigantescas dívidas públicas e privadas que começaram a paralisar inúmeros países e economias, sem destruir os devedores, nem os credores?
Para efeitos de simplificação narrativa, os credofres são protagonizados pela Alemanha, e os devedores, pela Espanha. Ao longo do seu longo post Pettis explica como Wolfgang Schaeuble não teve nenhuma razão quando afirmou —logo papagueado pelos nossos infelizes PM e PR— que
“The reasons for Greece’s problems can be attributable only to Greece and not to actors outside the country, and certainly not in Germany.”O artigo de Pettis recua até à Guerra Franco-Prussiana de 1870-1871, que deu a Bismarck uma grande oportunidade, ao vencer os franceses, de avançar decisivamente para a unificação alemã. A derrota da França, por sua vez, não só acabou com o regime decadente de Napoleão III, não só instaurou a III República francesa, como foi palco de uma das maiores indemnizações de guerra integralmente pagas de que há registo: cinco mil milhões de francos de ouro—23% do PIB francês(2).
O pedido inicial de indemnização teria sido de mil milhões, mas os alemães resolveram aumentar astronomicamente este valor nos termos finais do Tratado de Frankfurt, pretendendo assim colocar a França economicamente de rastos, sem fôlego para perturbar o caminho da jovem nação alemã. Para surpresa de todos, dos mercados, e certamente dos alemães, o prazo imposto para a liquidação da dívida —3 anos— foi antecipado em um ano pelo sucesso de duas emissões de dívida soberana francesa cuja procura largamente superou a oferta.
Mas o mais extraordinário é que o afluxo desta pipa de massa —para usar uma expressão recente de Durão Barroso a propósito do Acordo de Parceria 2014-2020— acabaria por lançar a Alemanha na sua primeira Grande Depressão (1873). Foi neste ano que nasceu o Deutsche Bank, o mesmo que hoje tem uma exposição aos derivados financeiros de 54,7 biliões de euros, quase 20x o PIB alemão, quase 6x o PIB da UE. Se apenas 10% desta exposição acabar em default, quem irá ensopar então um buraco de dívidas equivalente a duas vezes o PIB alemão?
De quem foi a culpa?
Dos franceses que pagaram as indemnizações de guerra, ou da Alemanha que usou o dinheiro como os PIIGS, em parte, desperdiçaram fundos comunitários e investimento estrangeiro em autoestradas para lado nenhum, barragens inúteis, rotundas idiotas e um Mercedes à porta de cada Câmara Municipal, ou ainda férias em praias exóticas, como se não tivessemos mais de 1800 Km de costa marítima?
O post de Michael Pettis vem na linha da sua tese de que as grandes crises de gestão dos défices e das dívidas têm frequentemente, pelo menos na sua fase inicial, causas externas. Neste sentido, quando as mesmas ficam fora de controlo, a melhor saída possível para devedores e credores pode exigir a anulação parcial das dívidas e a reestruturação.
Mas não é isto que o BCE tem vindo a fazer na Eurolândia salvando, desde logo, os bancos da famosa crise sistémica? Não tem havido abatimentos parciais, extensões de prazos e reduções sucessivas de juros nalgumas dívidas públicas? Sim, mas Pettis afirma que a fatura tem sido enviada sobretudo aos trabalhadores e à classe média, com prejuízos graves para um eventual regresso ao crescimento.
Defende, assim, que seria melhor uma ação de reestuturação clara das dívidas, em vez de prolongar as meias medidas, a indecisão, e sobretudo a agonia social que trava o regresso ao crescimento e, desde logo, a confiança dos mercados!
Aviso final aos portugueses
Nas próximas eleições não podemos votar uma vez mais nos que criaram a crise. Ou não votamos, ou votamos em quem for capaz de, entretanto, trazer para a mesa da discussão democrática ideias claras sobre como levantar a canga da dívida que tem vindo a esmagar a nossa economia e as nossas vidas.
Os partidos do Bloco Central empurraram Portugal para o lixo, e não apresentaram até agora soluções credíveis para sairmos da escravidão da dívida. Enquanto não expurgarem de si mesmos os ativos tóxicos e a corrupção entranhada não serão capazes, nem de tirar o país da miséria para que caminha, nem sequer de participar em soluções que outros proponham aos portugueses e em quem o país confie para as aplicar.
Precisamos de imaginação e coragem para desenhar e adotar um mecanismo novo de resolução da dívida pública portuguesa, que não seja um grilhão inibidor do crescimento e do emprego, mas um compromisso social claro que trave a corrupção e garanta o controlo das contas públicas, a transparência e as condições de um crescimento sustentável.
_1894.jpg) |
| Toulouse-Lautrec. O Fotógrafo, Place pigeon, 9 (1894) |
Syriza and the French indemnity of 1871-73
By Michael Pettis · February 4, 2015
CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS
“...the current European crisis is boringly similar to nearly every currency and sovereign debt crisis in modern history.”
— extratos
[...]
“Except for Greece, in Europe the main political parties on both sides of the political spectrum have until now chosen to maintain the value of the currency and protect the interests of the creditors. It has been the extremist parties, either on the right or the left, who have attacked the currency union and the interests of the creditors. In many cases these parties are extreme nationalists and oppose the existence of the European Union. If they succeed in taking control of the debate, the European experiment will almost certainly collapse, and it will take decades, if ever, for a European union to revive.
But while distortions in the savings rate are at the root of the European crisis, many if not most analysts have failed to understand why. Until now, an awful lot of Europeans have understood the crisis primarily in terms of differences in national character, economic virtue, and as a moral struggle between prudence and irresponsibility. This interpretation is intuitively appealing but it is almost wholly incorrect, and because the cost of saving Europe is debt forgiveness, and Europe must decide if this is a cost worth paying (I think it is), to the extent that the European crisis is seen as a struggle between the prudent countries and the irresponsible countries, it is extremely unlikely that Europeans will be willing to pay the cost. As my regular readers know, I generally refer to the two different groups of creditor and debtor countries as “Germany” and “Spain”, the former for obvious reasons and the latter because I was born and grew up there, and it is the country I know best. I will continue to do so in this blog entry.”
[...]
“It is useful to remember this history when we confront the consequences of Greece’s recent elections. Syriza’s victory in Greece has reignited the name-calling and moralizing that has characterized much of the discussion on peripheral Europe’s unsustainable debt burden. I think it is pretty clear, and obvious to almost everyone, that Greece simply cannot repay its external obligations, and one way or another it is going to receive substantial debt forgiveness. There isn’t even much pretence at this point. This morning financial advisor Mish Shedlock, sent me (as a joke? as a sign of despair?) German newspaper Zeit‘s interview with Yanis Varoufakis entitled “I’m the Finance Minister of a Bankrupt Country”.
Even if the question of who is to “blame”, Greece or Germany, were an important one, the answer would not change the debt dynamics. It would take the equivalent of Ceausescu’s brutal austerity policies in Romania, which were imposed during the 1980s in order for the country fully to repay its external debt, to resolve the Greek debt burden without a write-down. Given that Ceausescu’s policies led directly to the 1989 revolution, which culminated in both Ceausescu and his wife being executed by firing squad, the reluctance in Athens to imitate Romania in the 1980s is probably not surprising.”
[...]
“If the restructuring is well designed, within a year of the restructuring I think we could easily see Greek growth surprise us with its vigor. I was delighted to see that Greece’s new Finance minister agrees. An article in Monday’s Financial Times starts with the claim that “Greece’s radical new government revealed proposals on Monday for ending the confrontation with its creditors by swapping outstanding debt for new growth-linked bonds, running a permanent budget surplus and targeting wealthy tax-evaders.” Today’s Financial Times has an article by Martin Wolf that mentions the benefits of “a growth linked bond”. In The Volatility Machine I spend chapters explaining how to create liability structures that minimize external shocks, align the interests of creditors and citizens, and improve the quality of payments for creditors, and I show why these make a restructuring much more successful for all parties concerned. This is just basic finance theory. Yanis Varoufakis should really take the lead in designing an entirely new form of sovereign debt restructuring, not just for Greece but for the many countries, in Europe and elsewhere, that will soon follow it into default.
Enough people seem to hate or fear Syriza that there will be little attempt to approach Greece’s problems with enough imagination to give either party what it needs, but in fact with the right cooperation, imagination, and intuitive understanding of how balance sheet structures change overall value creation, a Greek debt restructuring could leave both sides far better off than either side might imagine. Of course if done right this matters far more than for just its impact on the Greek economy. While everyone probably agrees that Greece simply cannot proceed without debt forgiveness, less widely agreed, but no less obvious in my opinion, is that there are a number of other European countries that also need debt forgiveness if they are to grow. Because I was born and grew up in Spain, and my French mother founded and ran a successful business there which my family and I still own, I am confident that I know the country well enough to say that even with some impressive reforms having been implemented under Mariano Rajoy, Spain is nonetheless one of these countries. I suspect that many other countries including Portugal, Italy, and maybe even France are too.
I also know, however, that Spanish debt prospects are an extremely sensitive and emotional topic, and I will be roundly condemned for saying this. Today’s Financial Times has a very worrying article explaining why Madrid wants to be seen among the hardliners in opposing a rational treatment for Greece: “when it comes to helping Greece, there will be no such thing as southern solidarity or peripheral patronage.” This is the reverse of what it should be doing. In an article for Politica Exterior in January 2012, I actually proposed, albeit without much hope, that Spain take the lead and organize the debtor countries to negotiate a sustainable agreement, but in its fear of Podemos, the Spanish equivalent of Syriza, and its determination to be one of the “virtuous” countries, it strikes me that Madrid is probably moving in the wrong direction economically. Ultimately, by tying itself even more tightly to the interests of the creditors, Rajoy and his associates are only making the electoral prospects for Podemos all the brighter.”
[...]
“1. There is no question that a renegotiation of Spanish debt or of its status within the currency union would be accompanied by economic hardship and perhaps even a crisis. But compared to what? The Spanish economy is already in disastrous shape and there is compelling historical evidence that countries suffering under excessive debt burdens can never grow their way out of their debt no matter how radical and forceful the reforms.”
[...]
“Some economists argue the facts on the ground already contradict my pessimism. Last week Madrid announced excitedly that GDP grew by 1.7% last year, its fastest pace in seven years. The Financial Times pointed out that Spain was well-positioned in 2015 to continue to take advantage of lower energy costs, a weaker euro, and a cut in personal and corporate taxes, to which I would add lower metal prices, massive QE, and stronger than expected consumption. But even if these tailwinds are permanent, and they clearly are not, nominal GDP growth is still much lower than the growth in the debt burden. This is as good as it gets, in other words, and it is not good enough. As the debt burden continues to climb, and as social and political frustrations mount, Spain will slide inexorably backwards into the backward-country status it wants so badly to avoid.”
[...]
“Above all this is not a story about nations. Before the crisis German workers were forced to pay to inflate the Spanish bubble by accepting very low wage growth, even as the European economy boomed. After the crisis Spanish workers were forced to absorb the cost of deflating the bubble in the form of soaring unemployment. But the story doesn’t end there. Before the crisis, German and Spanish lenders eagerly sought out Spanish borrowers and offered them unlimited amounts of extremely cheap loans — somewhere in the fine print I suppose the lenders suggested that it would be better if these loans were used to fund only highly productive investments.
But many of them didn’t, and because they didn’t, German and Spanish banks — mainly the German banks who originally exported excess German savings — must take very large losses as these foolish investments, funded by foolish loans, fail to generate the necessary returns. It is no great secret that banking systems resolve losses with the cooperation of their governments by passing them on to middle class savers, either directly, in the form of failed deposits or higher taxes, or indirectly, in the form of financial repression. Both German and Spanish banks must be recapitalized in order that they can eventually recognize the inevitable losses, and this means either many years of artificially boosted profits on the back of middle class savers, or the direct transfer of losses onto the government balance sheets, with German and Spanish household taxpayers covering the debt repayments.”
“I am not rejecting the claim that “Spain” acted irresponsibly, in other words, only to place the blame on “German” irresponsibility. But it is absolutely wrong for Volker Kauder, the parliamentary caucus leader of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats, to say, according to an article in last week’s Bloomberg, that “Germany bears no responsibility for what happened in Greece. The new prime minister must recognize that.” There was indeed plenty of irresponsible behavior on both sides, during which time wealth was transferred from workers of both countries to create the boom and to absorb the subsequent bust, and wealth will be transferred again from middle class households of both countries to clean up the resulting debt debacle.”
Put differently, there is no national virtue or national vice here, and there is no reason for the European crisis to devolve into right-wing, nationalist extremism. The financial crisis in Europe, like all financial crises, is ultimately a struggle about how the costs of the adjustment will be allocated, either to workers and middle class savers or to bankers, owners of real and financial assets, and the business elite. Because the major parties have refused to acknowledge the nature of this allocation process, and have turned it into a fight between a creditor Germany, on the one hand, and indebted peripheral European countries on the other, I was able to make in 2010-11 one of the easiest predictions I have ever made in my career — whichever extremist parties, whether of the right or of the left, who first went on the offensive against Germany, the bankers and the currency bureaucrats, I predicted, would surge in electoral popularity and would eventually reformulate the debate.”
[...]
“I think there are several points that those of us who want “Europe” to survive should be making.
1. The euro crisis is a crisis of Europe, not of European countries. It is not a conflict between Germany and Spain (and I use these two countries to represent every European country on one side or the other of the boom) about who should be deemed irresponsible, and so should absorb the enormous costs of nearly a decade of mismanagement. There was plenty of irresponsible behavior in every country, and it is absurd to think that if German and Spanish banks were pouring nearly unlimited amounts of money into countries at extremely low or even negative real interest rates, especially once these initial inflows had set off stock market and real estate booms, that there was any chance that these countries would not respond in the way every country in history, including Germany in the 1870s and in the 1920s, had responded under similar conditions.
2. The “losers” in this system have been German and Spanish workers, until now, and German and Spanish middle class savers and taxpayers in the future as European banks are directly or indirectly bailed out. The winners have been banks, owners of assets, and business owners, mainly in Germany, whose profits were much higher during the last decade than they could possibly have been otherwise
3. In fact, the current European crisis is boringly similar to nearly every currency and sovereign debt crisis in modern history, in that it pits the interests of workers and small producers against the interests of bankers. The former want higher wages and rapid economic growth. The latter want to protect the value of the currency and the sanctity of debt.
4. I am not smart enough to say with any confidence that one side or the other is right. There have been cases in history in which the bankers were probably right, and cases in which the workers were probably right. I can say, however, that the historical precedents suggest two very obvious things. First, as long as Spain suffers from its current debt burden, it does not matter how intelligently and forcefully it implements economic reforms. It will not be able to grow out of its debt burden and must choose between two paths. One path involves many, many more years of economic hell, as ordinary households are slowly forced to absorb the costs of debt — sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly in the form of financial repression, unemployment, and debt monetization. The other path is a swift resolution of the debt as it is restructured and partially forgiven in a disruptive but short process, after which growth will return and almost certainly with vigor
5. Second, it is the responsibility of the leading centrist parties to recognize the options explicitly. If they do not, extremist parties either of the right or the left will take control of the debate, and convert what is a conflict between different economic sectors into a nationalist conflict or a class conflict. If the former win, it will spell the end of the grand European experiment.”
NOTAS
- Michael Pettis é o autor dum famoso livro publicado em 2001 —The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economics and the Threat of Financial Collapse— onde pela primeira vez se procura demonstrar, a propósito das crises de endividamento ocorridas na Argentina, países asiáticos emergentes, Rússia, e em geral desde 1820, que a perda de controlo sobre a gestão das dívidas soberanas tem tido uma origem sobretudo externa.
- Para termos um termo de comparação que dá bem a ideia das enormidades cometidas pelo nosso, muito indígena, Bloco Central da Corrupção, as responsabilidades contraídas pelo estado português nos 120 contratos de Parcerias Público Privadas representam 35% do PIB. Parte dos 23% do PIB francês que voram para a jovem Alemanha regressariam sob a forma de investimento alemão, e muito dinheiro gasto no futuro Quartier Pigalle! Ou seja, o Capitalismo estava numa fase explosiva de crescimento, e as dívidas eram uma forma expedita de crescer rapidamente. Pelo contrário, quando Portugal se lançou na corrida do endividamento comunitário, os tempos já eram de fim de festa. Cada euro acrescentado à dívida pública e privada portuguesa seria um grilhão mais na cadeia que nos puxa cada vez o mais para o fundo do buraco.
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