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quarta-feira, fevereiro 06, 2019

César e Francisco

El papa Francisco, durante la rueda de prensa en el avión de regreso a Roma.
ALESSANDRA TARANTINO (AP)/ cropped

O meu reino não é deste mundo


El cinismo del papa Francisco 
La neutralidad del Vaticano en la crisis venezolana sirve de apoyo a Maduro
RUBÉN AMÓN
El País, 5 FEB 2019 - 15:30 CET 
No es Irán la única teocracia contemporánea que abjura del presidente Guaidó. Se resiste a reconocerlo el Vaticano, tanto por la idiosincrasia bolivariana del papa Francisco como porque su actual secretario de Estado, Pietro Parolin, fue el artífice de la reconciliación —de la comunión— entre el chavismo y la Santa Sede en los tiempos idólatras del mariscal Hugo. 
Es la razón por la que Nicolás Maduro ha pedido la mediación moral y política del sumo pontífice. Pretende involucrarlo como árbitro de una conferencia de países “neutrales” —México, Uruguay— convocada en Montevideo este jueves como salida al aislamiento del tirano venezolano.

Interessante, esta análise! É um facto que as ditaduras nunca assustaram o Vaticano. Basta lembrar a Itália de Mussolini, a Espanha de Franco, o Portugal de Salazar, e o Chile de Pinochet. Porque haveria então o Papa Francisco, que encanta o hedonista Marcelo, de se preocupar com o chavismo e o seu desastrado herdeiro, Nicolás Maduro? A Deus o que é de Deus, a César o que é de César. Foi este negócio com as autocracias que garantiu a esta, como a outras igrejas, a longevidade do atavismo religioso. Secundariamente, esta posição 'simpática' para com o ditador Maduro, até permitirá ao Vaticano fazer a mediação que o resto dos europeus já não é capaz.

Russos e chineses acharam que poderiam avançar pelo Atlântico e pelas Américas dentro. Não podem. Mas lá que os Estados Unidos e os caniches europeus lhes deram pretexto, nomeadamente na forma hipócrita, interesseira e estúpida como lidaram com o colapso da União Sovética, e mais recentemente com a Ucrânia, ou ainda com a soberania sobre o mar do Sul da China, deram...

Agora vai ser preciso reequilibrar os dispositivos de forças, quer a leste de Berlim, quer no quintal latino-americano dos gringos. Voltamos sempre ao mesmo: a paz futura depende da realização dum Novo Tratado de Tordesilhas. Dum lado deve ficar a Euro-América, do outro a China. No meio, precisamos dum continente independente, próspero e neutral: a África.

Dito isto, a posição diplomática assumida pelo governo português é absolutamente correta. Não se defendem os interesses de Portugal, nem dos portugueses emigrados na Venezuela, apoiando um ditador alimentado com sinodólares e euros de Moscovo.

Vamos provavelmente assistir a um prolongado braço de ferro, sobretudo porque dependerá de concessões a fazer ao longo da antiga cortina de ferro, na Síria e... no Irão. Já agora, um Irão nuclear será um player decisivo no Médio Oriente, podendo mesmo afastar o espectro de Putin na região. Daí que seja tempo de os americanos e europeus darem corda aos snickers!


REFERÊNCIAS
El Papa sobre Venezuela: “Temo un derramamiento de sangre” 
DANIEL VERDÚ
El País, A bordo del avión del Papa 28 ENE 2019 - 14:23 CET 
La posición del Vaticano en el conflicto de Venezuela ha sido siempre ambigua y discreta. Su frustrado papel como mediador lo requirió en su momento. Pero ahora, en pleno ultimátum de un nutrido bloque de países a Nicolás Maduro para que convoque elecciones, millones de venezolanos y los propios mandatarios implicados —con Juan Guaidó a la cabeza de la oposición— se preguntan cuál es la opinión del Papa y la postura que adoptará la Santa Sede, con enorme influencia en la comunidad católica del país, en un conflicto que camina peligrosamente hacia la violencia. El Papa, tras varios días de silencio, pidió en el Ángelus del domingo en Panamá “una solución justa y pacífica”. Pero, ¿qué quiere decir eso? 
Los hombres de Pinochet en el Vaticano 
JUAN JOSÉ TAMAYO
El País, 2 MAR 1999 
Desde su toma de poder en Chile, tras el golpe de Estado contra el presidente Salvador Allende, el general Pinochet buscó denodadamente el apoyo del Vaticano a su dictadura militar alegando como credenciales su fe católica y su cruzada contra el marxismo, llevada a cabo en plena sintonía con Juan Pablo II, antimarxista como él. Mientras el arzobispo de Santiago de Chile, cardenal Silva Enríquez, denunciaba los atentados de Pinochet contra los derechos humanos -incluido el derecho a la vida- a través de la Vicaría de Solidaridad, el Vaticano legitimaba las actuaciones del dictador, sobre todo a través de la nunciatura.Tras los resultados adversos del plebiscito de octubre de 1988, que le obligaron a abandonar el poder, Pinochet redobló sus esfuerzos por asegurarse el aval del Vaticano, confiando en que saliera en su defensa en caso de que fuera procesado. Y la larga sombra del general se extendió hasta la curia romana, donde hoy ocupan puestos de responsabilidad de primera línea personalidades eclesiásticas afines a él.


segunda-feira, março 26, 2018

Sharp Power

Vladimir Putin e Xi Jinping em Moscovo, julho 2017.


Por onde passará o Tordesilhas 2.0?


Vem aí um novo debate. Chama-se Sharp Power. Por onde passará a próxima fronteira entre o Ocidente e o Oriente? Se fosse por Portugal, onde a penetração chinesa é já muito apreciável, se não mesmo exagerada, tal significaria a capitulação de toda a Europa ao novo e cada vez mais indisfarçável despotismo asiático. Infelizmente, Rússia e China caminham rapidamente em direção ao passado, e o perigo que desta regressão começa a emergir é cada vez mais preocupante. O debate ideológico sobre a democracia, sobre a transparência e a prevalência do estado de direito, e fundamentalmente sobre a liberdade individual e coletiva regressa, pois, quando todos pensávamos que as ditaduras socialistas tinham desaparecido. Não desapareceram. Estão mesmo a ressuscitar com grande cinismo e arrogância.

O recente escândalo da captura do Facebook, por parte da muito obscura Cambridge Analytica, para a manipulação do eleitorado americano durante a eleição que daria a vitória a Donald Trump, vem certamente justificar os alertas que o bem conhecido think tank da inteligência estratégica dos Estados Unidos—Council on Foreign Relations— tem vindo a lançar desde dezembro de 2017.

How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power
The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence
By Joseph S. Nye Jr.
in Foreign Affairs/ Council on Foreign Relations
January 24, 2018


Washington has been wrestling with a new term that describes an old threat. “Sharp power,” as coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig of the National Endowment for Democracy (writing for ForeignAffairs.com and in a longer report), refers to the information warfare being waged by today’s authoritarian powers, particularly China and Russia. Over the past decade, Beijing and Moscow have spent tens of billions of dollars to shape public perceptions and behavior around the world—using tools new and old that exploit the asymmetry of openness between their own restrictive systems and democratic societies. The effects are global, but in the United States, concern has focused on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and on Chinese efforts to control discussion of sensitive topics in American publications, movies, and classrooms.

(...)

In international politics, soft power (a term I first used in a 1990 book) is the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than through the hard power of coercion and payment. Soft power is rarely sufficient on its own. But when coupled with hard power, it is a force multiplier. That combination, though hardly new (the Roman Empire rested on both the strength of Rome’s legions and the attractions of Rome’s civilization), has been particularly central to U.S. leadership. Power depends on whose army wins, but it also depends on whose story wins. A strong narrative is a source of power.

(...)

But if sharp power has disrupted Western democratic processes and tarnished the brand of democratic countries, it has done little to enhance the soft power of its perpetrators—and in some cases it has done the opposite. For Russia, which is focused on playing a spoiler role in international politics, that could be an acceptable cost. China, however, has other aims that require the soft power of attraction as well as the coercive sharp power of disruption and censorship. These two goals are hard to combine. In Australia, for example, public approval of China was growing, until increasingly alarming accounts of its use of sharp power tools, including meddling in Australian politics, set it back considerably. Overall, China spends $10 billion a year on its soft power instruments, according to George Washington University’s David Shambaugh, but it has gotten minimal return on its investment. The “Soft Power 30” index ranks China 25th (and Russia 26th) out of 30 countries assessed.

(...)

In public diplomacy, when Moscow’s RT or Beijing’s Xinhua broadcasts openly in other countries, it is employing soft power, which should be accepted even if the message is unwelcome. When China Radio International covertly backs radio stations in other countries, that crosses the line into sharp power, which should be exposed. Without proper disclosure, the principle of voluntarism has been breached. (The distinction applies to U.S. diplomacy as well: during the Cold War, secret funding for anticommunist parties in the 1948 Italian election and the CIA’s covert support to the Congress for Cultural Freedom were examples of sharp power, not soft power.)

Today’s information environment introduces additional complications. In the 1960s, the broadcaster Edward R. Murrow noted that the most important part of international communications was not the ten thousand miles of electronics, but the final three feet of personal contact. But what does that mean in a world of social media? “Friends” are a click away, and fake friends are easy to fabricate; they can propagate fake news generated by paid trolls and mechanical bots. Discerning the dividing line between soft and sharp power online has become a task not only for governments and the press but also for the private sector.

As democracies respond to sharp power, they have to be careful not to overreact, so as not to undercut their own soft power by following the advice of those who advocate competing with sharp power on the authoritarian model. Much of this soft power comes from civil societies—in the case of Washington, Hollywood, universities, and foundations more than official public diplomacy efforts—and closing down access or ending openness would waste this crucial asset. Authoritarian countries such as China and Russia have trouble generating their own soft power precisely because of their unwillingness to free the vast talents of their civil societies.

Moreover, shutting down legitimate Chinese and Russian soft power tools can be counterproductive. Like any form of power, soft power is often used for competitive zero-sum purposes, but it can also have positive-sum effects. For example, if China and the United States wish to avoid conflict, exchange programs that increase American attraction to China, and vice versa, can be good for both countries. And on transnational challenges such as climate change, soft power can help build the trust and networks that make cooperation possible. Yet as much as it would be a mistake to prohibit Chinese soft power efforts simply because they sometimes shade into sharp power, it is important to monitor the dividing line carefully. Take the 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius classrooms that China supports in universities and schools around the world to teach Chinese language and culture. Government backing does not mean they are necessarily a sharp power threat. The BBC also gets government backing but is independent enough to remain a credible soft power instrument. Only when a Confucius Institute crosses the line and tries to infringe on academic freedom (as has occurred in some instances) should it be treated as sharp power.

To respond to the threat, democracies should be careful about offensive actions. Information warfare can play a useful tactical role on the battlefield, as in the war against the Islamic State (or ISIS). But it would be a mistake for them to imitate the authoritarians and launch major programs of covert information warfare. Such actions would not stay covert for long and when revealed would undercut soft power.


The Meaning of Sharp Power
How Authoritarian States Project Influence
By Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig
in Foreign Affairs/ Council on Foreign Relations
November 16, 2017

Although there are differences in the shape and tone of the Chinese and Russian approaches, both stem from an ideological model that privileges state power over individual liberty and is fundamentally hostile to free expression, open debate, and independent thought.

(...)

Beijing and Moscow have methodically suppressed genuine dissent, smeared or silenced political opponents, inundated their citizens with propagandistic content, and deftly co-opted independent voices and institutions—all while seeking to maintain a deceptive appearance of pluralism, openness, and modernity. Indeed, the dazzling variety of content available to consumers helps disguise the reality that the paramount authorities in these countries brook no dissent. In China’s case, a sophisticated system of online manipulation—which includes a vast, multilayered censorship system and “online content monitors” in government departments and private companies who number in the millions—is designed to suppress and neutralize political speech and collective action, even while encouraging many ordinary people to feel as though they can express themselves on a range of issues they care about.

(...)

As the essays in a forthcoming report by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies point out, the authoritarians are not engaged in a form of public diplomacy as democracies would understand it. Instead, they appear to be pursuing more malign objectives, often associated with new forms of outwardly directed censorship and information manipulation.

The serious challenge posed by authoritarian sharp power requires a multidimensional response that includes unmasking Chinese and Russian influence efforts that rely in large part on camouflage—disguising state-directed projects as the work of commercial media or grassroots associations, for example, or using local actors as conduits for foreign propaganda and tools of foreign manipulation. It will also require that the democracies, on the one hand, inoculate themselves against malign authoritarian influence that corrodes democratic institutions and standards and, on the other, take a far more assertive posture on behalf of their own principles.

segunda-feira, janeiro 30, 2017

A dúvida de Trump


Quem é o inimigo principal? A China, ou a Rússia?


Irá Donald Trump abandonar a teoria estratégica que dominou a diplomacia mundial desde 1904, ou, pelo contrário, o que está em causa, como sugere Immanuel Wallerstein, é saber se os Estados Unidos estarão finalmente preparados para ceder à China a missão estratégica de conter o expansionismo potencial da Rússia, esse famoso Coração da Terra descrito por Halford John Mackinder?

Most politicians, journalists, and academic analysts describe the relations of China and the United States as one of hostile competition, especially in East Asia. I disagree. I believe that the top of both countries' geopolitical agenda is reaching a long-term accord with the other. The major bone of contention is which of the two prospective partners will be the top dog.
—in “China and the United States: Partners?”
Immanuel Wallerstein. Commentary No. 441, Jan. 15, 2017

A verdade é que a Grande Rússia, czarista, soviética, ou putiniana é mesmo o coração da Eurásia, e é muito grande! Trata-se de um país continental com autonomia energética e alimentar, onde é possível ensaiar mísseis balísticos, bem como tentar aplicar a teoria do socialismo num só país. Ou seja, a sua inércia geopolítica é incomensurável, sendo que qualquer exercício de contenção sobre a elasticidade das suas fronteiras internas e próximas (Rimland) obriga a esforços económicos e humanos de incalculáveis custos, que sucessivas derrotas militares (Napoleão e Hitler, mas também Clinton, Bush e Obama) comprovaram tragicamente. A Alemanha tentou conquistar este Heartland e só não foi absorviva pela União Soviética porque os seus inimigos ocidentais da véspera lhe deitaram a mão imeditamente após a chegada das tropas russas a Berlim. O preço da ambição alemã foi, no entanto, a expansão da fronteira elástica da Mãe Rússia ao longo da chamada Cortina de Ferro e mesmo até ao interior da Alemanha, dividindo a sua capital em duas metades.

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.”  
—Winston Churchill

A América e a Europa ocidental, apesar de serem as mais ricas regiões económicas do planeta não têm disponibilidades financeiras e anímicas suficientes para continuarem a suportar os custos de um cerco geopolítico cada vez mais caro e com perdas colaterais cada vez maiores, de que a crise migratória, a par da radicalização social e política de um e outro lado do Atlântico são as maiores ameaças recentes à sua estabilidade. Mas se assim é, porque pretende Donald Trump uma trégua com Moscovo, provocar a Alemanha, e atacar Pequim? Não seria mais lógico aproximar-se da China e encomendar-lhe parte dos custos de contenção da ameaça russa?

Segundo Immanuel Wallerstein, este é o caminho, mas tem um senão: implica que os Estados Unidos cedam o seu papel de potência dominante à China, como outrora os ingleses acabariam por fazer relativamente à sua antiga colónia. Uma tal cedência, porém, é o contrário do que diz a consigna Make America Great Again.

Nada disto faz sentido. Aparentemente. Salvo se estivermos em presença de uma manobra perversa por parte dos Estados Unidos, nomeadamente depois de constatarem que o seu declínio prossegue de forma imparável e a sua sociedade está cada vez mais dividida e violenta, ao contrário de uma União Europeia e de uma moeda, o euro, que parecem resistir a todas as tentativas (americana, inglesa e russa) de as destruirem. A manobra seria esta: criar atrito com a China, provocar a União Europeia, dar espaço de manobra à Rússia, e esperar que os temores da China comecem a aflorar nas conversas privadas entre Washngton e Pequim. É que a autonomia energética chinesa chegou virtualmente ao fim. Sem energia abundante e barata mais limpa que o carvão, até hoje usado, e sem o petróleo/ gás natural do Médio Oriente e da Ásia Central, o colapso ecológico, mas também económico de Pequim, poderá estar a menos de duas décadas de distância. O crescimento real do PIB chinês não ultrapassa hoje os 5%. Ou seja, mais do que a América, cuja suficiência energética e alimentar continua a ser evidente, é a China—a qual faz parte do famoso Rimland do Coração da Terra— que precisa de conter a Rússia! Chegados aqui, os americanos bem poderiam recolher a penates e lamber as feridas de um século de imperialismo violento.

Conclusão: os Estados Unidos desejam secretamente ceder a supremacia à China, mas sem perder a face.



REFERÊNCIAS À TEORIA GEOESTRATÉGICA DE MACKINDER

A modernidade pós-medieval começa em 1415 (tomada de Ceuta pelos portugueses), ou em 1453 (queda de Constantinopla), ou em 1492 e 1500 (descoberta do continente americano), ou em 1522 (conclusão da primeira viagem de circum-navegação), e termina, segundo H. J. Mackinder, pouco depois de 1900. Este foi o tempo que levou a conhecer e desenhar o mapa da Terra até às suas mais ínfimas paragens. Depois desta aventura, o mundo tornou-se uma realidade geopolítica fechada, não havendo mais nenhuma 'última fronteira' a descobrir ou conquistar, mas tão só territórios delimitados por nações e estados, compondo placas tectónicas e geopolíticas cujos movimentos e atritos marcam o pulsar, por vezes violento, entre as comunidades humanas que nelas habitam.

Como escreveu Harold John Mackinder na sua famosa conferência de 1904 (traduzo livremente),
Quando os historiadores num remoto futuro olharem para o grupo de séculos por que estamos a passar, com uma perspetiva comprimida como aquela que nos dá a ver as dinastias do Egito, poderá muito bem acontecer que descrevam os últimos 400 anos como a época colombiana, e digam que a mesma acabou pouco depois de 1900. 

CITAÇÕES

##
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.”(Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150) 
Competition for gaining control over natural resources between Russia and the United States together with geopolitical and strategic factors characterized the geopolitics of Central Asia. Control over natural resources as well as market access is indeed the main motto of the foreign policy direction of both states. In fact, it may be said that outlined in 1904 through his speech, the “Heartland theory” was a founding moment for geopolitics. His argument regarding the control of the Eurasian landmass (Europe, Asia, and the Middle East), is still considered as the major geopolitical prize.  
—in “Heartland Theory” of Mackinder & its Relevancy in Central Asia Geopolitics
By Suban Kumar Chowdhury and Abdullah Hel Kafi
IndraStra. Saturday, June 25, 2016

##
In Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Australasia there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of ownership, unless as the result of a war between civilized or half-civilized powers. Even in Asia, we are probably witnessing the last moves of the game first played by the horsemen of Yermak the Cossack and the shipment of Vasco da Gama. Broadly speaking, we may contrast the Columbian epoch with the age which preceded it, describing its essential characteristic as the expansion of Europe against almost negligible resistances, whereas medieval Christendom was bent into a narrow region and threatened by external barbarism. From the present time forth, in the pos-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of worldwide scope. [...] 
European civilization is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion. [...] 
...the settled peoples of Europe lay gripped between two pressures—that of the Asiatic nomads from the east, and on the other three sides that of the pirates from the sea. From its very nature, neither pressure was overwhelming, and both, therefore, were stimulative. [...] 
It is probably one of the most striking coincidences of history that the seaward and the landward expansion of Europe should, in a sense, continue the ancient opposition between Roman and Greek. Few great failures have had more far-reaching consequences tan the failure of Rome to Latinize the Greek. The Teuton was civilized and Christianized by the Roman, the Slav in the main by the Greek. It is the Romano-Teuton who in later times embarked upon the ocean; it was the Graeco-Slav who rode over the steppes, conquering the Turanian. Thus the modern land-power differs from the sea-power no less in the source of its ideals than in the material conditions of its mobility. [...] 
For a thousand years a series of horse-riding peoples emerged from Asia through the broad interval between the Ural mountains and the Caspian sea, [...] 
The all-important result of the discovery of the Cape road to the Indies was to connect the western and the eastern coastal navigations of Euro-Asia, even though by a circuitous route, and thus in some measure to neutralize the strategical advantage of the central position of the steppe nomads by pressing upon them in the rear. 
—in The Geographical Pivot of History
H. J. Mackinder
The Geographical Journal
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Apr. 1904), pp. 421-437

##
Mackinder’s article argued that the coming of steam power, electricity, and the railways were, at last, permitting continental nations to overcome the physical obstacles that had hampered their development in the past. 
In particular, the railway was enabling tsarist Russia to exploit its vast internal resources and to make strategic inroads in the far east and towards India that its imperial rival Great Britain could not counter. Land power was thus eroding the geopolitical advantages that had been enjoyed by the western sea powers. 
The rest of the 20th century bore witness to Mackinder’s thesis. The two world wars were struggles for control of what the author called the “rimlands”, that swathe of territories running from eastern Europe to the Himalayas and beyond, just outside the Asian “heartland” itself. Soviet domination of that region during the cold war caused many a US geopolitician (Nicholas Spykman, for example) to recall Mackinder’s theories. And the recent projection of US military power into Afghanistan and various central Asian republics has rekindled interest in the hypothesis. 
—in The pivot of history
Paul Kennedy
The Guardian, Saturday 19 June 2004 12.02 BST

terça-feira, março 15, 2016

Putin retira da Síria, até ver...

Russos chegaram (à Síria), viram e venceram (uma vez mais)


Putin alivia pressão sobre os regime changers, depois de ter destruído a capacidade bélica e a moral dos rebeldes armados pelos Estados Unidos, Reino Unido e França. Um país destruído depois, e uma Europa de cócoras depois, com uma crise de refugiados de que é a principal responsável, a par dos Estados Unidos, a aviação russa começou a regressar a casa. Mas atenção Hilary: Putin poderá regressar ao teatro de guerra em 24 horas! A lição está dada: travar a Eurasia, destruir a ponte de Lisboa a Vladivostok, que Putin anunciou na Cimeira de Mafra, é uma péssima ideia. Esperemos que condenada ao fracasso.

Despite President Obama’s early contention that Russia would end up in a “quagmire” in Syria, The Kremlin instead showed what happens when a mishmash of loosely aligned rebels squares off against a modern air force. 
Five months and thousands upon thousands of sorties later, the rebel cause has become virtually hopeless. It’s much easier to broker a ceasefire when the enemy has been, for all intents and purposes, decimated. 
(...) 
If both sides come to some kind of tenuous agreement, Putin will get to claim that Russia came, saw, and conquered, then brokered a peace settlement - two things no country had been able to do in Syria since the beginning of the war in 2011 — in Zero Hedge.

quinta-feira, julho 09, 2015

Grexit a caminho dos BRICS?

Halford Mackinder: “The geographical pivot of history”.
The Geographical Journal, 1904


Poderá Tsipras deitar borda fora o mandato reforçado que detém?


 “Few great failures have had more far-reaching consequences than the failure of Rome to Latinize the Greek.” Halford Mackinder, 1904.

O que está em causa em mais esta tragédia grega é a capacidade do eixo franco-alemão que acelerou a criação da zona euro —no caso da Grécia, promovendo mesmo o seu acesso fraudulento ao clube (1)—, impedir a sua derrapagem, ou mesmo uma implosão de consequências imprevisíveis.

Vale a pena ler o texto da célebre conferência dada por Halford Mackinder na Real Sociedade de Geografia inglesa, em 25 de janeiro de 1904: “The geographical pivot of history”, pois aqui podemos encontrar o paradigma estratégico que ainda hoje determina o essencial das decisões estratégicas dos principais países do mundo: Estados Unidos, Rússia, China, Reino Unido, França, etc.

A ideia central de Mackinder é que o mundo aberto e em expansão da modernidade desbravado pela expansão marítima da Europa ocidental a partir do século 15 voltaria a fechar-se no dealbar do século 20 sob o estatuto de uma cartografia de mundos finalmente conhecidos, onde, sob o ponto de vista demográfico, económico e político, as principais dinâmicas de poder continuavam (e continuam) a residir nas tensões potenciais entre a Grande Rússia e os crescentes que a rodeiam e ao mesmo tempo a separam dos mares: a Europa ocidental (de que as Américas são uma extensão), o Próximo Oriente, a Índia, a China, a Coreia e o Japão.

Curiosamente, a Grécia continua mais próxima da Rússia e dos interesses estratégicos desta, do que da União Europeia e do projeto franco-alemão do euro:
“It is probably one of the most striking coincidences of history that the seaward and the landward expansion of Europe should, in a sense, continue the ancient opposition between Roman and Greek. Few great failures have had more far-reaching consequences tan the failure of Rome to Latinize the Greek. The Teuton was civilized and Christianized by the Roman, the Slav in the main by the Greek. It is the Romano-Teuton who in later times embarked upon the ocean; it was the Graeco-Slav who rode over the steppes, conquering the Turanian. Thus the modern land-power differs from the sea-power no less in the source of its ideals than in the material conditions of its mobility.” Idem

A modernidade pós-medieval e transatlântica começa em 1415 e termina, segundo Mackinder, pouco depois do ano 1900, mas só o perceberemos provavelmente de um modo irrefutável em 2015, no rescaldo do colapso financeiro da Grécia, no meio da maior crise financeira desde 1929, seiscentos anos depois da conquista de Ceuta por Portugal — onde então reinava uma inglesa chamada Filipa de Lencastre, cuja visão estratégica viria a mudar a história do mundo sobre o qual Halford Mackinder elaborou uma notável visão geopolítica, que ainda hoje determina as ações de Putin e de Obama.

Obama Calls Merkel, Reinforces IMF Case Of Debt Haircut Zero Hedge, 07/07/2015 15:26 -0400

Readout of the President’s Call with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany

White House:

The President and German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke by phone this morning about Greece. The leaders agreed it is in everyone’s interest to reach a durable agreement that will allow Greece to resume reforms, return to growth, and achieve debt sustainability within the Eurozone. The leaders noted that their economic teams are monitoring the situation in Greece and remain in close contact.


Russia Asks Greece To Join BRICS Bank
Zero Hedge, Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/11/2015 12:27 -0400

As Bloomberg reports:

Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak spoke with Greek PM Alexis Tsipras today, proposed that Greece become 6th member of New Development Bank set up by Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, a Greek govt official says in e-mail to reporters.

A Europa e os Estados Unidos vivem há décadas acima das suas possibilidades.

Nada fizeram para corrigir esta mudança estrutural das suas economias, ou por outra, fizeram, aldrabando desde meados dos anos 80 do século passado (invenção dos CDO) os livros de contabilidade e os orçamentos, expandindo para dimensões lunáticas as suas massas monetárias e responsabilidades (dívidas), incentivando o consumo conspícuo e o mais ruinoso dos keynesianismos: ligar os tesouros soberanos (i.e. os governos) à especulação financeira global, esperando que o crescimento produtivo (e não meramente contabilístico, aldrabado) regressasse. Não regressou, e o resultado são borbulhas de mentiras e corrupção que rebentam e continuarão a rebentar por toda a parte, até que uma grande explosão, seguida de implosão geral dos mercados, obrigue a um GRANDE JUBILEU DAS DÍVIDAS, onde os prejuízos não recaiam todos sobre as populações indefesas.

É nestes momentos que os equilíbrios geográficos da política vêm de novo à superfície. A crise grega deixou, já há algum tempo, de ser uma crise económica (2) e financeira, para se transformar numa crise diplomática e estratégica de primeiro plano.

Estes dois notáveis discursos no Parlamento Europeu são uma excelente metáfora do momento crítico que vivemos.


I got angry this morning at Mr Tsipras, because we need to see concrete proposals coming from him. We can only avoid a #Grexit if he takes his responsibility. Watch my speech again here
Posted by Guy Verhofstadt on Quarta-feira, 8 de Julho de 2015




NOTAS
  1. ECB Tells Court Releasing Greek Swap Files Would Inflame Markets
    Bloomberg, June 14, 2012 — 1:32 PM BST

    June 14 (Bloomberg) -- The European Central Bank said it can’t release files showing how Greece may have used derivatives to hide its borrowings because disclosure could still inflame the crisis threatening the future of the single currency.

    Bloomberg News is suing the ECB to provide the documents under European Union freedom-of-information rules. The papers may help show the role EU authorities played in allowing Greece to mask its deficit for almost a decade before the nation’s troubled finances necessitated a 240 billion-euro ($301 billion) bailout and the biggest debt restructuring in history. 
  2. O que não quer dizer que a crise institucional, económica e financeira, não seja gravíssima, porque é. Um dos dos dados económicos invisíveis da incapacidade de a Grécia crescer significativamente é, tal como Portugal, a sua dependência do petróleo, que o gráfico abaixo ilustra dramaticamente. Também por aqui a sua aproximação aos BRICS trará provavelmente mudanças significativas no seu modelo de desenvolvimento.
"What Greece, Cyprus, and Puerto Rico Have in Common"—Gail Tverberg

sábado, fevereiro 28, 2015

Pax Americana? Niet! 不


China apoia Rússia no conflito ucraniano. Tordesilhas 2.0 dá mais um passo


Chinese diplomat tells West to consider Russia's security concerns over Ukraine
Reuters. BEIJING Fri Feb 27, 2015 3:48am EST

(Reuters) - Western powers should take into consideration Russia's legitimate security concerns over Ukraine, a top Chinese diplomat has said in an unusually frank and open display of support for Moscow's position in the crisis.

Qu Xing, China's ambassador to Belgium, was quoted by state news agency Xinhua late on Thursday as blaming competition between Russia and the West for the Ukraine crisis, urging Western powers to "abandon the zero-sum mentality" with Russia.

Há anos que vimos defendendo que o futuro do planeta oscila entre uma terceira guerra mundial em cenário MAD e uma espécie de um compromisso win-win semelhante ao famoso Tratado de Tordesilhas que, 1494, permitiu aos

“...mui poderosos príncipes os senhores D. Fernando e D. Isabel, pela graça de Deus rei e rainha de Castela, de Leão, de Aragão, de Sicília, de Granada, de Toledo, de Valência, de Galiza, de Mailhorca de Sevilha, de Cerdenha, de Córdova, de Córsega, de Murcia, de Jahem, do Algarve, de Algezira, de Gibraltar, das ilhas de Canárea, conde e condessa de Barcelona e senhores de Biscaia e de Molina, duques de Atenas e de Neopátria, Condes de Roselhão e de Cerdónia, marqueses de Oristão e de Goçiano.”
e ao
“...mui alto e mui excelente senhor o senhor D. João, pela graça de Deus rei de Portugal e dos Algarves daquém e dalém-mar em África e senhor de Guiné...”

dividir o mundo desconhecido entre si.

Enfim, depois vieram os holandeses, os ingleses e os franceses, mas no início foi assim: um meridiano elástico serviu de buffer à concorrência e conflitualidade sempre iminente entre Portugal e a ambição de hegemonia ibérica estabelecida pelos reis católicos Fernando de Castela e Isabel de Aragão—soberanos da região central da península para quem o acesso ao mar atlântico e mediterrânico e as passagens para França sempre foram críticas e vitais.

Os Descobrimentos Portugueses inseriram-se no primeiro verdadeiro movimento de globalização que se conhece, e foi, em grande medida, fruto de problemas semelhantes aos que voltamos a ter de forma aguda no Médio Oriente e na antiga Rota da Seda, ou seja na crucial Eurásia sobre a qual tanto tem escrito um dos principais estrategas norte-americanos, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ou ainda, com grande profundidade, o historiador britânico residente nos Estados Unidos, Paul Kennedy.

A Guerra dos 100 Anos foi igualmente um detonador importante da expansão ultramarina, sobretudo pelo lado inglês, depenado pela guerra, já sem ouro para pagar a colaboração holandesa na estratégia de tensão e guerra contra a França e os seus aliados: Escócia, Boêmia, Castela e Papado de Avinhão.

Os nossos historiadores, quase sempre mui atentos e obrigados, raramente objetivos, nunca estudaram convenientemente o casamento entre a inglesa de gema Phillipa of Lancaster e o nosso João I, nem o papel crucial que Filipa viria a ter na educação política e humanista dos seus filhos (Filipa fora educada por Geoffrey Chaucerthe Father of English literature, e autor dos famosos The Canterbury Tales), e sobretudo naquela que viria a ser a maior aventura do povo português desde que Afonso Henriques afirmou de espada na mão o nosso território vital.

A rainha portuguesa, com fortes ligações diplomáticas a Inglaterra e uma notória influência no seu país de origem, terá estado na origem da estratégia da conquista de Ceuta, a qual abriria as portas aos impérios ultramarinos europeus. Apanhada por uma epidemia de peste bubónica, morreira menos de um mês antes da Batalha de Ceuta, que teve lugar em 14 de agosto de 1415.

Esta breve excursão histórica é importante, pois completam-se este ano seis séculos de uma rotação da história mundial, hoje prestes a sofrer uma oscilação em sentido oposto, com o desembarque financeiro da China em Portugal. Quando a Europa do século XV saía da Idade Média, a China mergulhava no isolacionismo imperial que lhe daria cinco séculos de regressão tecnológica, económica, social e cultural.

Nasci em Macau e sei o suficnete da sensibilidade chinesa para poder afirmar que este é um ano de grande simbolismo para a China. Que grande oportunidade perdida por António Costa! Podia ter lido um discurso à altura deste momento simbólico, redigido por algum intelectual digno do nome, com grandeza e sabedoria. O que ocorreu foi uma farsa deprimente que em breve acabará com a imprestável carreira política de um alcaide que nem o cargo respeita.

Defendi e defendo que Lisboa seja para a China o que as Portas do Cerco sempre foram para Pequim ao longo de quatrocentos e quarenta e seis anos: um caminho de acesso à Europa, e um entreposto comercial privilegiado com a China.

Quando passeava pelo Bund de Xangai, numa noite de 1999, polvilhada de humidade e mistério, olhei para Pudong, então com menos de uma década de transformação naquilo que hoje é: uma impressionante metrópole. Não resisti anos mais tarde (2005) a imaginar a extensão do centro de Lisboa para a Margem Sul—uma cidade com duas margens como hoje Xangai é. Mais pequenina, sem perdermos a graça barroca da nossa história, mas ainda assim virada corajosamente e com imaginação para o futuro. Poderia a China ajudar-nos a tornar realidade esta visão? A guia que me acompanhava naquele passeio após um jantar memorável perguntou: em que pensas? Respondi: que o mundo é pequeno e que somos todos muito parecidos.

A China sabe que o inferno que hoje se vive no Médio Oriente e nas fronteiras naturais da Rússia resultam da estratégia de antecipação imperial americana, que pretende deste modo travar a expansão chinesa no mundo. Para que tal estratégia resulte será necessário aos americanos fazerem o contrário do que os europeus fizeram depois da queda de Constantinopla e da Batalha de Ceuta: fechar o ex-império ocidental ao exterior, ao Outro, numa espécie de Nova Idade Média, burocrática, autoritária, ressuscitando a caça às bruxas e o medo—matando a liberdade, claro.

Se é esta a ideia americana, tal implicará duas grandes guerras, uma contra a Rússia, na qual boa parte da Europa poderá ser destruída, e uma guerra contra a China, que começará, pelo norte, com uma confrontação liderada pelo Japão, e a sul, com a destruição da nova Rota da China em acelerada construção, através do bloqueio do Estreito de Malaca. O Pacífico será de novo um Inferno.


Talvez por compreender que os relógios desta aparente inevitabilidade aceleraram subitamente, a China tenha decidido esta semana tomar a decisão histórica de se colocar oficialmente ao lado da Rússia no conflito que a esta foi imposto pelo Ocidente, através de sucessivas provocações, de que a tentativa de integrar a Ucrânia na União Europeia e na NATO foi a gota de água que transbordou de um copo já demasiado cheio.

Se esta análise aderir à realidade, como penso que adere, Portugal está metido num grande sarilho.

A menos que acorde e resolva lançar-se na missão histórica de propor e intermediar a negociação dum novo Tratado de Tordesilhas, em nome da paz, mas sobretudo em nome de uma estratégia win-win, como aquela que no longínquo dia 7 de junho de 1494 os reis na Ibéria souberam pactar, seremos sujeitos a enormes pressões vindas do Oriente e do Ocidente. A minha cabeça está em Portugal, mas uma parte do meu coração vive em Pequim, Xangai e os olfactos primordiais nasceram em Macau.

China Just Sided With Russia Over The Ukraine Conflict
Zero Hedge. Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/27/2015 22:25 -0500

When it comes to the Ukraine proxy war, which started in earnest just about one year ago with the violent coup that overthrew then president Yanukovich and replaced him with a local pro-US oligarch, there has been no ambiguity who the key actors were: on the left, we had the west, personified by the US, the European Union, and NATO in general; while on the right we had Russia. In fact, if there was any confusion, it was about the role of that other "elephant in the room" - China.


Se gostou do que leu apoie a continuidade deste blogue com uma pequena doação

quinta-feira, fevereiro 05, 2015

Grexit?

Clique para ampliar

BCE tirou o tapete à Grécia, mas não é a primeira vez...


Grexit? Aparentemente o BCE fez xeque-mate ao Syriza, i.e. a um governo democraticamente eleito, retirando-lhe o tapete de acesso às garantias até hoje dadas pelo BCE aos tomadores de dívida pública grega, i.e. os bancos e fundos privados gregos e de outros países. Será que o Syriza continuará em frente, ou vai desviar-se da colisão? Se não se desviar, quem sofrerá mais com a colisão? A Grécia, que já pouco tem a perder, ou a desnorteada e subserviente Europa, que se arrisca a ver uma desintegração do euro em menos de um ano?

BCE deixa de aceitar dívida pública grega como garantia nos empréstimos aos bancos
Observador

O Banco Central Europeu suspendeu hoje a dispensa das regras de rating mínimo no uso da dívida pública grega como garantia nos empréstimos do BCE à banca comercial, dizendo que “não é possivel esperar-se nesta altura que a revisão do programa seja concluída com sucesso”. A decisão faz com que os bancos que têm dívida grega deixem de a poder dar como garantia ao BCE quando lhe pedem dinheiro emprestado. Falta de financiamento dos bancos gregos terá agora de ser compensada pelo Banco Central da Grécia.

Será que Matthieu Pigasse (Lazard Bank), contratado por Yanis Varoufakis para desenhar soluções digeríveis para a bancarrota grega, falou, ou deixou falar, antes de tempo? Calculou mal a jogada? Ou será que a reação de Draghi e dos demais bancos centrais europeus constava dos seus cenários—aliás tornados públicos, nomeadamente, pela Bloomberg, no dia 1 de fevereiro? Amanhã saberemos.

What’s Going On with Greece and the ECB?
Bull Markethttps://medium.com/bull-market/whats-going-on-with-the-ecb-and-greece-3821de717625

Rules Require Cutting Off Greek Government Bonds?

[...]

“There will be no surprises if we find out that a country is below that rating and there’s no longer a program that that waiver disappears,” ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio said at an event in Cambridge, England, on Saturday.

If Vice President Constancio is referring to cutting off eligibility of specific bonds as collateral, that argues against the ECB’s’s current “official” approach being one of threatening a full cut-off of funds. Still, the idea of “junk-rated bonds are only eligible if a country is in a program” being part of “the ECB’s rules” is an over-statement. In truth, the ECB makes up these rules as it goes along and the “in again, out again” routine with Greek government bond eligibility is a long-standing one at this point.

Se repararmos bem no mapa dos gasodutos existentes, parcialmente construídos, ou em projeto, destinados a levar gás natural à Europa, perceberemos claramente que a Ucrânia e a Grécia são dois dos peões da estratégia de tensão em curso. A Alemanha, tal como a generalidade dos países do centro e norte da Europa, precisam de gás para não morrerem de frio no inverno.

Acontece que os Estados Unidos, seguindo a teoria estratégica de Halford Backinder, e do seu seguidor fiel, Zbigniew Brzeziński —consultor estratégico de Barak Obama—, consideram o controlo da Rússia essencial para impedir a supremacia da China, e de caminho também acham que quem controlar as reservas de petróleo e de gás natural, controla o mundo. Foi assim ao longo de todo o século 20. Será assim durante o século 21.

Depois da queda da União Soviética, os Estados Unidos montaram um apertado cerco militar à Rússia, através de alianças e da promoção de guerras regionais. A gota de água para a Rússia foi a tentativa de absorver a Ucrânia, berço da Rússia, na NATO. Perante a passividade dos europeus, e o oportunismo alemão, a Rússia respondeu à provocação, mostrando o que sucederia se o gás fornecido à Europa através da Ucrânia fosse interrompido. Daqui à escalada económico-financeira e militar foi um passo.

À medida que a Europa assustada procurava uma alternativa ao gás russo, lançando o fracassado projeto do gasoduto conhecido por Nabucco pipeline, que ficou no papel depois da desistência da Áustria, outros potenciais fornecedores de gás natural (Qatar-Irão, Iraque, Arábia Saudita, Israel, Turquemenistão) posicionaram-se no que passaria a ser uma corrida com implicações tremendas na região. O terrorismo, como exemplo típico de conflito assimétrico, a par de uma série de guerras vicariantes (proxy wars) em teatros localizados nas zonas de passagem dos vários potenciais gasodutos que querem concorrer com a Rússia no fornecimento de gás à Europa, passaram a entupir a paisagem mediática global com propaganda e imagens terríveis de ação psicológica.

Basta olhar para a importância que países como a Ucrânia e a Grécia têm nos acessos principais de gás natural à Europa para perceber que as discussões sobre as economias e os regimes políticos destes países não passam de pretextos que escondem jogos estratégicos fundamentais.

A recente descida abrupta do preço do petróleo esteve, afinal, relacionada com uma ofensiva dos Estados Unidos e da Arábia Saudita destinada a pressionar a Rússia a deixar cair Bashar al-Assad. Se Putin não ceder, arrisca-se a ver o seu país mergulhar numa crise financeira, económica e social que lhe pode ser fatal. Mas se ceder ao garrote dos preços baixos do petróleo, a quase exclusividade da Rússia no fornecimento de gás à Europa central, do norte e de leste, ficará comprometida.

A decisão do BCE, certamente determinada pela Alemanha, mas também pelos Estados Unidos, apesar das palavras carinhosas de Obama para com o novo poder grego, de aumentar a tensão na Grécia, tem mais que ver com a hipótese de uma aproximação entre a Grécia, a Turquia e a Rússia, do que com o problema da renegociação da dívida.


POST SCRITUM

É de notar que o mensageiro da decisão de o BCE tirar o tapete à Grécia foi o nosso querido e mui socialista Victor Constâncio. Que diz o sargento Costa e a nossa indigente Esquerda a isto?


RESPOSTA À PERGUNTA “TEM A CERTEZA QUE O EURO DESAPARECE?”

Não. Na realidade, o dólar quer apenas capturar o euro e fazer dele uma moeda subsidiária.

Ou seja, os Estados Unidos querem, compreensivelmente, manter a supremacia atlântica sobre a Eurásia, e para tal precisam de uma estratégia de pau e cenoura para com os alemães (euro sim, mas menos germanófilo).

Por exemplo, retirar à Rússia o monopólio de fornecimento de gás ao centro-norte-leste da União Europeia é um objetivo estratégico, que serve a Alemanha, a UE no seu conjunto, e os aliados da América no Médio Oriente: Arábia Saudita, Qatar, Israel...

No entanto, creio que os EUA querem mesmo enfraquecer a Rússia, para assim atingirem a China.

O perigo da situação vem daqui. E é neste sentido que a atuação do BCE e da senhora Merkel poderão, se o senhor Draghi não for pondo água na fervura, precipitar um choque frontal na Grécia (Grexit), de consequências imprevisíveis.

O colapso do euro, precedido de uma saída da Grécia, lançaria toda a Europa, a começar por Portugal, Espanha, Itália, França... numa situação particularmente complicada no que toca à reestruturação dissimulada (e em curso) das suas impagáveis dívidas (pública e privada).

Se em cima disto a Rússia, a Turquia e a China vierem em auxílio da Grécia, e em geral dos países europeus do Mediterâneo, teremos o caldo entornado.

Num cenário destes, a Rússia poderia mesmo fechar as torneiras à Ucrânia, i.e. à Alemanha; e poderia reforçar o apoio à Síria, bloqueando os gasodutos islâmico e árabe a favor dos gasodutos que vêm de Baku, do Turquemenistão e da Rússia, com passagem apenas pela Turquia, até chegar à Grécia.

A Europa precisará sempre de muito gás para se aquecer, não é verdade?

Resumindo, a questão financeira, e o problema grego, são muito mais do que o que aparentam.

As duas últimas guerras mundiais estiveram intimamente ligadas ao controlo das rotas do petróleo. A próxima grande guerra poderá acontecer por causa do controlo das rotas do gás.

A Alemanha já provou duas vezes que é incapaz de perceber os ventos da História, e que é suficientemente quadrada para se meter em armadilhas de onde depois não consegue sair.

É por isto que uma saída da Grécia do euro (Grexit), precipitada por comportamentos radicais do BCE e da Alemanaha, pode vir a rebentar com o euro, uma moeda demasiado atrelada ao invisível marco alemão!

ARTIGOS RELACIONADOS NESTE MESMO BLOG

Atualização: 5/2/2015, 12:28 WET

terça-feira, julho 22, 2014

MH17: mais uma provocação americana?

Informação russa sobre provável autor do ato de terrorismo contra o avião malaio

Infoguerra domina derrube criminoso do avião civil malaio


Parece que os Boeing da Malasia Airlines têm uma certa tendência para se desviarem das suas rotas e depois desaparecerem ou serem abatidos em pleno voo... em situações sempre muito propícias ao desencadear de guerras de grandes proporções. Chineses e russos têm resistido às provocações. Criaram recentemente o seu FMI e o seu Banco Mundial, com o Brasil, a Índia e a África do Sul. Os falcões americanos falidos espumam... Os nazi-sionistas de Israel bombardeiam hospitais em Gaza perante o silêncio cúmplice do Prémio Nobel da Guerra e o apoio canino de alguns historiadores da Tugalândia, desmiolados e sem um pingo de ética. Só não vê quem não quiser ver...

Comunicação Twitter original, em espanhol, dum controlador de tráfego aéreo operando em Kiev, sobre quem abateu o avião malaio

CHRONOLOGY OF @spainbuca’s TWITTER FEED

10:21 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Autoridades de kiev, intentan hacer que pueda parecer un ataque de los pro-rusos

10:24 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Ojo! Que puede ser un derribo B777 Malaysia Airlines en ukraine, 280 pasajeros

10:25 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Cuidado! Kiev tiene lo que buscaba

10:25 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Vuelven a tomar la torre de control en Kiev

10:27 – 17 de jul. de 2014 El avión B777 de Malaysia Airlines desapareció del radar, no hubo comunicación de ninguna anomalia, confirmado

10:30 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Avión derribado, derribados, derribado no accidente

10:31 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Kiev, tiene lo que buscaba, lo dije en los primeros tw, kiev es responsable @ActualidadRT

10:35 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Un accidente muy normal no es, no están amenazando en la misma torre del aeropuerto de kiev,

10:35 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Nos van a quitar, nuestros tlf y demás de un momento a otro

10:38 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Antes de que me quiten el tlf o me rompan la cabeza, derribado por Kiev

11:12 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Nosotros tenemos la confirmación. Avión derribado, la autoridad de kiev, ya tiene la información, derribado, estamos tranquilos ahora

11:13 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Que hace personal extranjero con autoridades de kiev en la torre? Recopilando toda la información

11:15 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Cuando sea posible sigo escribiendo

11:48 – 17 de jul. de 2014 El avión B 777 voló escoltado por 2 cazas de ukraine hasta minutos antes, de desaparecer de los radares,

11:54 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Sí las autoridades de kiev, quieren decir la verdad, esta recogido 2 cazas volaron muy cerca minutos antes , no lo derribo un caza

12:00 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Nada más desaparecer el avión B 777 de Malaysia Airlines la autoridad militar de kiev nos informo del derribo, como lo sabían?

12:00 – 17 de jul. de 2014 A los 7:00 minutos se notificó el derribo, más tarde se tomó la torre nuestra con personal extranjero q siguen aquí

12:01 – 17 de jul. de 2014 En los radares esta todo recogido, para los incrédulos, derribado por kiev, aquí lo sabemos y control aéreo militar también

13:15 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Aquí los mandos militares manejan y admiten que militares a otras órdenes, pudieron ser, pero no, los pro-rusos

13:29 – 17 de jul. de 2014 El ministro del interior si conocía que, hacían los cazas en la zona, el ministro de defensa no, .

13:31 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Militares confirman que fue ukraine, pero se sigue sin saber de donde vino la orden

13:36 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Hace dias lo dije aquí, militares de kiev querían alzarse contra el actual presidente, esto puede ser una forma, a las órdenes de timoshenko

13:38 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Los cazas volaron cerca del 777, hasta 3 minutos antes de desaparecer de los radares, solo 3 minutos

13:43 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Se cierra el espacio aéreo

13:45 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Se cierra el espacio aéreo, por miedo a más derribos

15:17 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Control militar entrega ahora mismo de forma oficial que el avión fue derribado por misil

15:23 – 17 de jul. de 2014 El informe oficial firmado por las autoridades militares de control de kiev ya lo tiene el gobierno,,,,, derribado

15:26 – 17 de jul. de 2014 En el informe se indica de donde abría salido el misil, y se especifica que no proviene de las autodefensa en las zonas rebeldes

15:34 – 17 de jul. de 2014Los radares militares si recogieron los datos del misil lanzado al avión, los radares civiles no

15:36 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Los altos mandos militares no ordenaron el lanzamiento del misil, ,,alguien se le fue la mano en nombre de ukraine

15:38 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Para el que no lo sepa, digamos así, hay militares a las órdenes del ministro de defensa y militares a las órdenes del ministro del interior

15:38 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Los militares a las órdenes del ministro del interior conocían en cada momento lo que sucedió, .

16:06 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Mandos militares aquí (ATC) torre de control, confirman que el misil es del ejercito de ukraine,

16:07 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Mandos militares que si lo sabían y otros mandos que no,

16:08 – 17 de jul. de 2014 290 personas inocentes muertas, . Por una guerra inútil, donde el patriotismo se compra con dinero

16:09 – 17 de jul. de 2014 La forma de tomar la torre de control minutos después sabiendo todo los detalles, rápido nos hizo pensar que habían sido ellos

16:10 – 17 de jul. de 2014 La cara de los militares que llegaron más tarde diciendo pero que habéis echo, no dejo dudas

16:12 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Es tal la decadencia que los militares acompañados de extranjeros que llegaron primero nos llegaron a pedir que dijéramos su versión

16:13 – 17 de jul. de 2014 Nuestra respuesta, fue, estos radares no recogen el lanzamiento de misiles, los militares si, ya no quedaban dudas.


LINK


Ler tb:

Russia Says Has Photos Of Ukraine Deploying BUK Missiles In East, Radar Proof Of Warplanes In MH17 Vicinity
Tyler Durden on 07/21/2014 18:45 -0400
ZeroHedge

What Happened to the Malaysian Airliner?
Paul Craig Roberts, July 19, 2014
IPE - Institute for Political Economy

Why was the missile system where it was? Why risk an expensive missile system by deploying it in a conflict environment in which it is of no use? Incompetence is one answer, and another is that the missile system did have an intended use.

[...]

The second explanation is that the extremists who operate outside the official Ukrainian military, hatched a plot to down an airliner in order to cast the blame on Russia. If such a plot occurred, it likely originated with the CIA or some operative arm of Washington and was intended to force the EU to cease resisting Washington’s sanctions against Russia and to break off Europe’s valuable economic relationships with Russia. Washington is frustrated that its sanctions are unilateral, unsupported by its NATO puppets or any other countries in the world except possibly the lap-dog British PM.

It was Putin's missile!
By Pepe Escobar
Asia Times, Jul 18, '14


Ron Paul: Don't Blame Putin For Malaysian Jet Shoot Down
By Courtney Coren, Friday, 18 Jul 2014 02:44 PM
Newsmax

Atualizado: 23/7/2014, 19:53

segunda-feira, fevereiro 02, 2009

Crise Global 59

Davos: a nova divisão internacional do trabalho

Enquanto os manifestantes anti-globalização decoravam os noticiários de mais uma cimeira de Davos, e em Portugal um primeiro ministro aldrabão e aparentemente corrupto tem saturado a paisagem mediática local, dois discursos estratégicos de grande importância estão a caminho de mudar profundamente a paisagem económica e política mundial, muito para além do episódio sintomático do abandono dos trabalhos da cimeira por parte do primeiro ministro turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan numa reacção intempestiva ao desfavorecimento do tempo de intervenção que lhe fora concedido relativamente ao homólogo israelita Shimon Peres.

Embora com graus de diplomacia e subtileza retórica diferenciados, Vladimir Putin e Wen Jiabao, fizeram uma análise coincidente sobre as causas da actual crise económico-financeira global: uma América demasiado endividada, consumidora voraz de recursos materiais e financeiros, responsável por um gigantesco esquema Ponzi à escala mundial, e emitente de uma moeda de reserva que perdeu toda a credibilidade. Nas receitas para a crise, China e Rússia formularam ainda ideias semelhantes, que apontam para uma nova e mais justa divisão internacional do trabalho, implicando um acesso mais equilibrado e proporcional de todos os países aos recursos disponíveis, uma nova disciplina financeira mundial, a prioridade da economia real face às economias de casino e o fim do dólar como única moeda de reserva mundial (Wen Jiabao confiou este último recado a Putin...). Ambos os países consideram ainda que o investimento na paz é uma aposta de longo prazo vencedora, ao contrário dos especuladores que insistem nas aventuras militares.

Vale a pena ler integralmente os dois discursos.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao speaks at the World Economic Forum annual meeting, in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 28, 2009. / (Xinhua/Yao Dawei)

Strengthen Confidence and Work Together for A New Round of World Economic Growth

28 January 2009

Professor Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to be here and address the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009. Let me begin by thanking Chairman Schwab for his kind invitation and thoughtful arrangements. This annual meeting has a special significance. Amidst a global financial crisis rarely seen in history, it brings together government leaders, business people, experts and scholars of different countries to jointly explore ways to maintain international financial stability, promote world economic growth and better address global issues. Its theme — “Shaping the Post-Crisis World” is highly relevant. It reflects the vision of its organizers. People from across the world are eager to hear words of wisdom from here that will give them strength to tide over the crisis. It is thus our responsibility to send to the world a message of confidence, courage and hope. I look forward to a successful meeting.

The ongoing international financial crisis has landed the world economy in the most difficult situation since last century’s Great Depression. In the face of the crisis, countries and the international community have taken various measures to address it. These measures have played an important role in boosting confidence, reducing the consequences of the crisis, and forestalling a meltdown of the financial system and a deep global recession. This crisis is attributable to a variety of factors and the major ones are: inappropriate macroeconomic policies of some economies and their unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption; excessive expansion of financial institutions in a blind pursuit of profit; lack of self-discipline among financial institutions and rating agencies and the ensuing distortion of risk information and asset pricing; and the failure of financial supervision and regulation to keep up with financial innovations, which allowed the risks of financial derivatives to build and spread. As the saying goes, “A fall in the pit, a gain in your wit,” we must draw lessons from this crisis and address its root causes. In other words, we must strike a balance between savings and consumption, between financial innovation and regulation, and between the financial sector and real economy.

The current crisis has inflicted a rather big impact on China’s economy. We are facing severe challenges, including notably shrinking external demand, overcapacity in some sectors, difficult business conditions for enterprises, rising unemployment in urban areas and greater downward pressure on economic growth.

As a big responsible country, China has acted in an active and responsible way during this crisis. We mainly rely on expanding effective domestic demand, particularly consumer demand, to boost economic growth. [ELAINE: unlike Japan!] We have made timely adjustment to the direction of our macroeconomic policy, swiftly adopted a proactive fiscal policy and a moderately easy monetary policy, introduced ten measures to shore up domestic demand and put in place a series of related policies. Together, they make up a systematic and comprehensive package plan aimed at ensuring steady and relatively fast economic growth.

First, substantially increase government spending and implement a structural tax cut. The Chinese Government has rolled out a two-year program involving a total investment of RMB 4 trillion, equivalent to 16 percent of China’s GDP in 2007. The investment will mainly go to government-subsidized housing projects, projects concerning the well-being of rural residents, railway construction and other infrastructural projects, environmental protection projects and post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction. Some of them are identified as priority projects in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. The rest are additional ones to meet the needs of the new situation. This two-year stimulus program has gone through scientific feasibility studies and is supported by a detailed financial arrangement. RMB 1.18 trillion will come from central government’s budget, which is expected to generate funds from local governments and other sources. The Chinese Government has also launched a massive tax cut program which features the comprehensive transformation of the value-added tax, the adoption of preferential tax policies for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and real estate transactions, and the abolition or suspension of 100 items of administrative fees. It is expected to bring about a total saving of RMB 500 billion for businesses and households each year.

Second, frequently cut interest rates and increase liquidity in the banking system. The central bank has cut deposit and lending rates of financial institutions five times in a row, with the one-year benchmark deposit and lending rates down by 1.89 percentage points and 2.16 percentage points respectively. Thus the financial burden of companies has been greatly reduced. The required reserve ratio has been lowered four times, adding up to a total reduction of 2 percentage points for large financial institutions and 4 percentage points for small and medium-sized ones. This has released around RMB 800 billion of liquidity and substantially increased funds available to commercial banks. A series of policy measures have been adopted in the financial sector to boost economic growth, including increasing lending, optimizing the credit structure, and providing greater financial support to agriculture and the SMEs.

Third, implement the industrial restructuring and rejuvenation program on a large scale. We are seizing the opportunity to push ahead comprehensive industrial restructuring and upgrading. To this end, plans are being drawn up for key industries such as automobile and iron and steel, which not only focus on addressing the immediate difficulties of enterprises but also look toward their long-term development. We have taken strong measures to facilitate the merger and reorganization of enterprises, phase out backward production capacity, promote advanced productive forces, and improve industry concentration and the efficiency of resource allocation. We encourage our enterprises to upgrade technologies and make technological renovation. We support them in making extensive use of new technologies, techniques, equipment and materials to restructure their product mix, develop marketable products and improve their competitiveness. Our financial support policies are being improved, a sound credit guarantee system installed and market access eased for the benefit of SME development.

Fourth, actively encourage innovation and upgrading in science and technology. We are speeding up the implementation of the National Program for Medium- and Long-Term Scientific and Technological Development with a special focus on 16 key projects in order to make breakthroughs in core technologies and key generic technologies. This will provide scientific and technological support for China’s sustainable economic development at a higher level. We are developing high-tech industrial clusters and creating new social demand and new economic growth areas. Fifth, substantially raise the level of social security.

We have accelerated the improvement of social safety net. We will continue to increase basic pension for enterprise retirees and upgrade the standard of unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation. We will raise the level of basic cost of living allowances in both urban and rural areas, welfare allowances for those rural residents without family support and the special allowances and assistance to entitled groups. This year, the central budget for social security and employment will increase at a much higher rate than the growth of the overall fiscal revenue.

We are advancing the reform of the medical and health system and working to put in place a nationwide basic medical and health system covering both urban and rural areas within three years and achieve the goal of everyone having access to basic medical and health service. It is estimated that governments at all levels will invest RMB 850 billion for this purpose. We give priority to education and are now working on the Guidelines of the National Program for Medium- and Long-Term Educational Reform and Development.

This year, we will increase public funds for compulsory education in rural areas, offer more financial support to students from poor families and improve the well-being of middle and primary school teachers so as to promote equity in education and optimize the educational structure. We are using every possible means to lessen the impact of the financial crisis on employment.

We are following a more active employment policy. In particular, we have introduced various policy measures to help college graduates and migrant workers find jobs and provided more government-funded jobs in public service. These major policy measures as a whole target both symptoms and root causes, and address both immediate and long-term concerns. They represent a holistic approach and are mutually reinforcing. They are designed to address the need to boost domestic demand, readjust and reinvigorate industries, encourage scientific innovation and strengthen social security. They are designed to stimulate consumption through increased investment, overcome the current difficulties with long-term development in mind, and promote economic growth in the interest of people’s livelihood. These measures can mobilize all resources to meet the current crisis.

China’s economy is in good shape on the whole. We managed to maintain steady and relatively fast economic growth in 2008 despite two unexpected massive natural disasters. Our GDP grew by 9 percent. CPI was basically stable. We had a good grain harvest for the fifth consecutive year, with a total output of 528.5 million tons. Eleven million and one hundred and thirty thousand new jobs were created in cities and towns. Household income in both urban and rural areas continued to rise. The financial system functioned well and the banking system kept its liquidity and credit asset quality at a healthy level. When China, a large developing country, runs its affairs well, it can help restore confidence in global economic growth and curb the spread of the international financial crisis. It will also help increase China’s imports and outbound investment, boost world economic growth and create more development and job opportunities for other countries. Steady and fast growth of China’s economy is in itself an important contribution to global financial stability and world economic growth.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Will China’s economy continue to grow fast and steadily? Some people may have doubts about it. Yet I can give you a definite answer: Yes, it will. We are full of confidence. Where does our confidence come from? It comes from the fact that the fundamentals of China’s economy remain unchanged. Thanks to our right judgment of the situation and prompt and decisive adjustment to our macroeconomic policy, our economy remains on the track of steady and fast development. Our package plan takes into consideration both the need to address current difficulties and that of long-term development. It is beginning to produce results and will be more effective this year. Our confidence comes from the fact that the long-term trend of China’s economic development remains unchanged.

We are in an important period of strategic opportunities and in the process of fast industrialization and urbanization. Infrastructure construction, upgrading of industrial and consumption structures, environmental protection and conservation projects, and various social development programs–all can be translated into huge demand and growth potential and will bolster relatively high-speed growth of our economy for a long time to come. Our confidence also comes from the fact that the advantages contributing to China’s economic growth remain unchanged. With 30 years’ of reform and opening-up, we have laid a good material, technological and institutional foundation.

We have a large well-trained and relatively low-cost labor force. We have a healthy fiscal balance, a sound financial system and adequate funds. Our system enables us to mobilize the necessary resources for big undertakings. There is harmony and stability in our society. What is more important, we follow a scientific approach to development which puts people first and seeks comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development. We are committed to reform, opening-up and win-win progress. We have found the right development path in line with China’s national conditions and the trend of our times. Our people are hard-working, persevering and resilient. It is precisely these fine qualities that endow China, a country with a time-honored history, with greater vitality in the face of adversities.

At the same time, there is no fundamental change in the external environment for China’s economic growth. The pursuit of peace, development and cooperation is the irreversible trend in today’s world. The readjustment to the international division of labor offers new opportunities. We have the confidence, conditions and ability to maintain steady and fast economic growth and continue to contribute to world economic growth.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The global financial crisis is a challenge for the whole world. Confidence, cooperation and responsibility are key to overcoming the crisis. Confidence is the source of strength. The power of confidence is far greater than what can be imagined. The pressing task for the international community and individual countries is to take further measures to restore market confidence as soon as possible. In times of economic hardships, confidence of all countries in the prospect of global economic development, confidence of leaders and people around the world in their countries, confidence of enterprises in investment and confidence of individuals in consumption are more important than anything else. In tackling the crisis, practical cooperation is the effective way. In a world of economic globalization, countries are tied together in their destinies and can hardly be separated from one another. The financial crisis is a test of the readiness of the international community to enhance cooperation, and a test of our wisdom.

Only with closer cooperation and mutual help, can we successfully manage the crisis. To prevail over the crisis, accepting responsibilities is the prerequisite. When governments fulfill their responsibilities with resolution and courage, they can help maintain a stable financial order and prevent the crisis from causing more serious damage on the real economy. Political leaders must be forward-looking. They should be responsible to the entire international community as well as to their own countries and people. It is imperative that we implement the broad agreement reached since the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. We should not only take more forceful and effective steps to tide over the current difficulties, but also push for the establishment of a new world economic order that is just, equitable, sound and stable. To this end, I would like to share with you the following ideas.

First, deepen international economic cooperation and promote a sound multilateral trading regime. Past experience shows that in crisis it is all the more important to stick to a policy of opening-up and cooperation. Trade protectionism serves no purpose as it will only worsen and prolong the crisis. It is therefore necessary to move forward trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. China firmly supports efforts to reach balanced results of the Doha Round negotiations at an early date and the establishment of a fair and open multilateral trading regime. As an important supplement to such a trading regime, regional economic integration should be vigorously promoted.

Second, advance the reform of the international financial system and accelerate the establishment of a new international financial order. The current crisis has fully exposed the deficiencies in the existing international financial system and its governance structure. It is important to speed up reform of the governance structures of major international financial institutions, establish a sound global financial rescue mechanism, and enhance capacity in fulfilling responsibilities. Developing countries should have greater say and representation in international financial institutions and their role in maintaining international and regional financial stability should be brought into full play. We should encourage regional monetary and financial cooperation, make good use of regional liquidity assistance mechanisms, and steadily move the international monetary system toward greater diversification.

Third, strengthen international cooperation in financial supervision and regulation and guard against the build-up and spread of financial risks. Financial authorities around the world should step up information sharing and the monitoring of global capital flows to avoid the cross-border transmission of financial risks. We should expand the regulation coverage of the international financial system, with particular emphasis on strengthening the supervision on major reserve currency countries. We should put in place a timely and efficient early warning system against crisis. We should introduce reasonable and effective financial regulatory standards and improve oversight mechanisms in such areas as accounting standards and capital adequacy requirements. We should tighten regulation of financial institutions and intermediaries and enhance transparency of financial markets and products.

Fourth, effectively protect the interests of developing countries and promote economic development of the whole world. The international community, developed countries in particular, should assume due responsibilities and obligations to minimize the damage caused by the international financial crisis on developing countries and help them maintain financial stability and economic growth. International financial institutions should act promptly to assist those developing countries in need through such measures as relaxing lending conditions. We should advance the international poverty reduction process and scale up assistance to the least developed countries and regions in particular with a view to building up their capacity for independent development.

Fifth, jointly tackle global challenges and build a better home for mankind. Issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, diseases, natural disasters, energy, resources and food security as well as the spread of terrorism bear on the very survival and development of mankind. No country can be insulated from these challenges or meet them on its own. The international community should intensify cooperation and respond to these challenges together.

I want to reaffirm here China’s abiding commitment to peaceful, open and cooperative development. China is ready to work with other members of the international community to maintain international financial stability, promote world economic growth, tackle various global risks and challenges, and contribute its share to world harmony and sustainable development.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The harsh winter will be gone and spring is around the corner. Let us strengthen confidence and work closely together to bring about a new round of world economic growth.

Thank you.
__________________
长期征婚,

征到为止。



Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s speech at the opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum

Davos, Switzerland January 28, 2009


Good afternoon, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to thank the forum’s organisers for this opportunity to share my thoughts on global economic developments and to share our plans and proposals. The world is now facing the first truly global economic crisis, which is continuing to develop at an unprecedented pace.

The current situation is often compared to the Great Depression of the late 1920s and the early 1930s. True, there are some similarities.

However, there are also some basic differences. The crisis has affected everyone at this time of globalisation. Regardless of their political or economic system, all nations have found themselves in the same boat.

There is a certain concept, called the perfect storm, which denotes a situation when Nature’s forces converge in one point of the ocean and increase their destructive potential many times over. It appears that the present-day crisis resembles such a perfect storm.

Responsible and knowledgeable people must prepare for it. Nevertheless, it always flares up unexpectedly.

The current situation is no exception either. Although the crisis was simply hanging in the air, the majority strove to get their share of the pie, be it one dollar or a billion, and did not want to notice the rising wave. In the last few months, virtually every speech on this subject started with criticism of the United States. But I will do nothing of the kind.

I just want to remind you that, just a year ago, American delegates speaking from this rostrum emphasised the US economy’s fundamental stability and its cloudless prospects. Today, investment banks, the pride of Wall Street, have virtually ceased to exist. In just 12 months, they have posted losses exceeding the profits they made in the last 25 years. This example alone reflects the real situation better than any criticism.

The time for enlightenment has come. We must calmly, and without gloating, assess the root causes of this situation and try to peek into the future. In our opinion, the crisis was brought about by a combination of several factors.

The existing financial system has failed. Substandard regulation has contributed to the crisis, failing to duly heed tremendous risks.

Add to this colossal disproportions that have accumulated over the last few years. This primarily concerns disproportions between the scale of financial operations and the fundamental value of assets, as well as those between the increased burden on international loans and the sources of their collateral.

The entire economic growth system, where one regional centre prints money without respite and consumes material wealth, while another regional centre manufactures inexpensive goods and saves money printed by other governments, has suffered a major setback.

I would like to add that this system has left entire regions, including Europe, on the outskirts of global economic processes and has prevented them from adopting key economic and financial decisions.

Moreover, generated prosperity was distributed extremely unevenly among various population strata. This applies to differences between social strata in certain countries, including highly developed ones. And it equally applies to gaps between countries and regions.

A considerable share of the world’s population still cannot afford comfortable housing, education and quality health care. Even a global recovery posted in the last few years has failed to radically change this situation.

And, finally, this crisis was brought about by excessive expectations. Corporate appetites with regard to constantly growing demand swelled unjustifiably. The race between stock market indices and capitalisation began to overshadow rising labour productivity and real-life corporate effectiveness.

Unfortunately, excessive expectations were not only typical of the business community. They set the pace for rapidly growing personal consumption standards, primarily in the industrial world. We must openly admit that such growth was not backed by a real potential. This amounted to unearned wealth, a loan that will have to be repaid by future generations. This pyramid of expectations would have collapsed sooner or later. In fact, this is happening right before our eyes.

* * *

Esteemed colleagues,

One is sorely tempted to make simple and popular decisions in times of crisis. However, we could face far greater complications if we merely treat the symptoms of the disease.

Naturally, all national governments and business leaders must take resolute actions. Nevertheless, it is important to avoid making decisions, even in such force majeure circumstances, that we will regret in the future.

This is why I would first like to mention specific measures which should be avoided and which will not be implemented by Russia.

We must not revert to isolationism and unrestrained economic egotism. The leaders of the world’s largest economies agreed during the November 2008 G20 summit not to create barriers hindering global trade and capital flows. Russia shares these principles.

Although additional protectionism will prove inevitable during the crisis, all of us must display a sense of proportion.

Excessive intervention in economic activity and blind faith in the state’s omnipotence is another possible mistake.

True, the state’s increased role in times of crisis is a natural reaction to market setbacks. Instead of streamlining market mechanisms, some are tempted to expand state economic intervention to the greatest possible extent.

The concentration of surplus assets in the hands of the state is a negative aspect of anti-crisis measures in virtually every nation.

In the 20th century, the Soviet Union made the state’s role absolute. In the long run, this made the Soviet economy totally uncompetitive. This lesson cost us dearly. I am sure nobody wants to see it repeated.

Nor should we turn a blind eye to the fact that the spirit of free enterprise, including the principle of personal responsibility of businesspeople, investors and shareholders for their decisions, is being eroded in the last few months. There is no reason to believe that we can achieve better results by shifting responsibility onto the state.

And one more point: anti-crisis measures should not escalate into financial populism and a refusal to implement responsible macroeconomic policies. The unjustified swelling of the budgetary deficit and the accumulation of public debts are just as destructive as adventurous stock-jobbing.

* * *

Ladies and gentlemen,

Unfortunately, we have so far failed to comprehend the true scale of the ongoing crisis. But one thing is obvious: the extent of the recession and its scale will largely depend on specific high-precision measures, due to be charted by governments and business communities and on our coordinated and professional efforts.

In our opinion, we must first atone for the past and open our cards, so to speak. This means we must assess the real situation and write off all hopeless debts and “bad” assets.

True, this will be an extremely painful and unpleasant process. Far from everyone can accept such measures, fearing for their capitalisation, bonuses or reputation. However, we would “conserve” and prolong the crisis, unless we clean up our balance sheets. I believe financial authorities must work out the required mechanism for writing off debts that corresponds to today’s needs.

Second. Apart from cleaning up our balance sheets, it is high time we got rid of virtual money, exaggerated reports and dubious ratings. We must not harbour any illusions while assessing the state of the global economy and the real corporate standing, even if such assessments are made by major auditors and analysts. In effect, our proposal implies that the audit, accounting and ratings system reform must be based on a reversion to the fundamental asset value concept. In other words, assessments of each individual business must be based on its ability to generate added value, rather than on subjective concepts. In our opinion, the economy of the future must become an economy of real values. How to achieve this is not so clear-cut. Let us think about it together.

Third. Excessive dependence on a single reserve currency is dangerous for the global economy. Consequently, it would be sensible to encourage the objective process of creating several strong reserve currencies in the future. It is high time we launched a detailed discussion of methods to facilitate a smooth and irreversible switchover to the new model.

Fourth. Most nations convert their international reserves into foreign currencies and must therefore be convinced that they are reliable. Those issuing reserve and accounting currencies are objectively interested in their use by other states.

This highlights mutual interests and interdependence.

Consequently, it is important that reserve currency issuers must implement more open monetary policies. Moreover, these nations must pledge to abide by internationally recognised rules of macroeconomic and financial discipline. In our opinion, this demand is not excessive.

At the same time, the global financial system is not the only element in need of reforms. We are facing a much broader range of problems.

This means that a system based on cooperation between several major centres must replace the obsolete unipolar world concept.

We must strengthen the system of global regulators based on international law and a system of multilateral agreements in order to prevent chaos and unpredictability in such a multipolar world. Consequently, it is very important that we reassess the role of leading international organisations and institutions. I am convinced that we can build a more equitable and efficient global economic system. But it is impossible to create a detailed plan at this event today.

It is clear, however, that every nation must have guaranteed access to vital resources, new technology and development sources. What we need is guarantees that could minimise risks of recurring crises.

Naturally, we must continue to discuss all these issues, including at the G20 meeting in London, which will take place in April.

* * *

Our decisions should match the present-day situation and heed the requirements of a new post-crisis world.

The global economy could face trite energy-resource shortages and the threat of thwarted future growth while overcoming the crisis.

Three years ago, at a summit of the Group of Eight, we raised the issue of global energy security. We called for the shared responsibility of suppliers, consumers and transit countries. I think it is time to launch truly effective mechanisms ensuring such responsibility.

The only way to ensure truly global energy security is to form interdependence, including a swap of assets, without any discrimination or dual standards. It is such interdependence that generates real mutual responsibility.

Unfortunately, the existing Energy Charter has failed to become a working instrument able to regulate emerging problems.

I propose we start laying down a new international legal framework for energy security. Implementation of our initiative could play a political role comparable to the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. That is to say, consumers and producers would finally be bound into a real single energy partnership based on clear-cut legal foundations.

Every one of us realises that sharp and unpredictable fluctuations of energy prices are a colossal destabilising factor in the global economy. Today’s landslide fall of prices will lead to a growth in the consumption of resources.

On the one hand, investments in energy saving and alternative sources of energy will be curtailed. On the other, less money will be invested in oil production, which will result in its inevitable downturn. Which, in the final analysis, will escalate into another fit of uncontrolled price growth and a new crisis.

It is necessary to return to a balanced price based on an equilibrium between supply and demand, to strip pricing of a speculative element generated by many derivative financial instruments.

To guarantee the transit of energy resources remains a challenge. There are two ways of tackling it, and both must be used.

The first is to go over to generally recognised market principles of fixing tariffs on transit services. They can be recorded in international legal documents.

The second is to develop and diversify the routes of energy transportation. We have been working long and hard along these lines.

In the past few years alone, we have implemented such projects as the Yamal- Europe and Blue Stream gas pipelines. Experience has proved their urgency and relevance.

I am convinced that such projects as South Stream and North Stream are equally needed for Europe’s energy security. Their total estimated capacity is something like 85 billion cubic meters of gas a year.

Gazprom, together with its partners – Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi – will soon launch capacities for liquefying and transporting natural gas produced in the Sakhalin area. And that is also Russia’s contribution to global energy security.

We are developing the infrastructure of our oil pipelines. The first section of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) has already been completed. BPS-1 supplies up to 75 million tonnes of oil a year. It does this direct to consumers – via our ports on the Baltic Sea. Transit risks are completely eliminated in this way. Work is currently under way to design and build BPS-2 (its throughput capacity is 50 million tonnes of oil a year.

We intend to build transport infrastructure in all directions. The first stage of the pipeline system Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean is in the final stage. Its terminal point will be a new oil port in Kozmina Bay and an oil refinery in the Vladivostok area. In the future a gas pipeline will be laid parallel to the oil pipeline, towards the Pacific and China.

* * *

Addressing you here today, I cannot but mention the effects of the global crisis on the Russian economy. We have also been seriously affected.

However, unlike many other countries, we have accumulated large reserves. They expand our possibilities for confidently passing through the period of global instability.

The crisis has made the problems we had more evident. They concern the excessive emphasis on raw materials in exports and the economy in general and a weak financial market. The need to develop a number of fundamental market institutions, above all of a competitive environment, has become more acute.

We were aware of these problems and sought to address them gradually. The crisis is only making us move more actively towards the declared priorities, without changing the strategy itself, which is to effect a qualitative renewal of Russia in the next 10 to 12 years.

Our anti-crisis policy is aimed at supporting domestic demand, providing social guarantees for the population, and creating new jobs. Like many countries, we have reduced production taxes, leaving money in the economy. We have optimised state spending.

But, I repeat, along with measures of prompt response, we are also working to create a platform for post-crisis development.

We are convinced that those who will create attractive conditions for global investment already now and will be able to preserve and strengthen sources of strategically meaningful resources will become leaders of the restoration of the global economy.

This is why among our priorities we have the creation of a favourable business environment and development of competition; the establishment of a stable loan system resting on sufficient internal resources; and implementation of transport and other infrastructure projects.

Russia is already one of the major exporters of a number of food commodities. And our contribution to ensuring global food security will only increase.

We are also going to actively develop the innovation sectors of the economy. Above all, those in which Russia has a competitive edge – space, nuclear energy, aviation. In these areas, we are already actively establishing cooperative ties with other countries. A promising area for joint efforts could be the sphere of energy saving. We see higher energy efficiency as one of the key factors for energy security and future development.

We will continue reforms in our energy industry. Adoption of a new system of internal pricing based on economically justified tariffs. This is important, including for encouraging energy saving. We will continue our policy of openness to foreign investments.

I believe that the 21st century economy is an economy of people not of factories. The intellectual factor has become increasingly important in the economy. That is why we are planning to focus on providing additional opportunities for people to realise their potential.

We are already a highly educated nation. But we need for Russian citizens to obtain the highest quality and most up-to-date education, and such professional skills that will be widely in demand in today’s world. Therefore, we will be pro- active in promoting educational programmes in leading specialities.

We will expand student exchange programmes, arrange training for our students at the leading foreign colleges and universities and with the most advanced companies. We will also create such conditions that the best researchers and professors – regardless of their citizenship – will want to come and work in Russia.

History has given Russia a unique chance. Events urgently require that we reorganise our economy and update our social sphere. We do not intend to pass up this chance. Our country must emerge from the crisis renewed, stronger and more competitive.

* * *

Separately, I would like to comment on problems that go beyond the purely economic agenda, but nevertheless are very topical in present-day conditions.

Unfortunately, we are increasingly hearing the argument that the build-up of military spending could solve today’s social and economic problems. The logic is simple enough. Additional military allocations create new jobs.

At a glance, this sounds like a good way of fighting the crisis and unemployment. This policy might even be quite effective in the short term. But in the longer run, militarisation won’t solve the problem but will rather quell it temporarily. What it will do is squeeze huge financial and other resources from the economy instead of finding better and wiser uses for them.

My conviction is that reasonable restraint in military spending, especially coupled with efforts to enhance global stability and security, will certainly bring significant economic dividends.

I hope that this viewpoint will eventually dominate globally. On our part, we are geared to intensive work on discussing further disarmament.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the economic crisis could aggravate the current negative trends in global politics.

The world has lately come to face an unheard-of surge of violence and other aggressive actions, such as Georgia’s adventurous sortie in the Caucasus, recent terrorist attacks in India, and escalation of violence in Gaza Strip. Although not apparently linked directly, these developments still have common features.

First of all, I am referring to the existing international organisations’ inability to provide any constructive solutions to regional conflicts, or any effective proposals for interethnic and interstate settlement. Multilateral political mechanisms have proved as ineffective as global financial and economic regulators.

Frankly speaking, we all know that provoking military and political instability, regional and other conflicts is a helpful means of distracting the public from growing social and economic problems. Such attempts cannot be ruled out, unfortunately.

To prevent this scenario, we need to improve the system of international relations, making it more effective, safe and stable.

There are a lot of important issues on the global agenda in which most countries have shared interests. These include anti-crisis policies, joint efforts to reform international financial institutions, to improve regulatory mechanisms, ensure energy security and mitigate the global food crisis, which is an extremely pressing issue today.

Russia is willing to contribute to dealing with international priority issues. We expect all our partners in Europe, Asia and America, including the new US administration, to show interest in further constructive cooperation in dealing with all these issues and more. We wish the new team success.

* * *

Ladies and gentlemen, The international community is facing a host of extremely complicated problems, which might seem overpowering at times. But, a journey of thousand miles begins with a single step, as the proverb goes.

We must seek foothold relying on the moral values that have ensured the progress of our civilisation. Integrity and hard work, responsibility and self-confidence will eventually lead us to success.

We should not despair. This crisis can and must be fought, also by pooling our intellectual, moral and material resources.

This kind of consolidation of effort is impossible without mutual trust, not only between business operators, but primarily between nations.

Therefore, finding this mutual trust is a key goal we should concentrate on now.

Trust and solidarity are key to overcoming the current problems and avoiding more shocks, to reaching prosperity and welfare in this new century.

Thank you.

OAM 531 01-02-2009 01:29